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Abstract
We consider a two-road dynamic routing game where the state of one of the roads
(the “risky road”) is stochastic and may change over time. This generates room for
experimentation. A central planner may wish to induce some of the (finite number of
atomic) agents to use the risky road even when the expected cost of travel there is high
in order to obtain accurate information about the state of the road. Since agents are
strategic, we show that in order to generate incentives for experimentation the central
planner however needs to limit the number of agents using the risky road when the
expected cost of travel on the risky road is low. In particular, because of congestion,
too much use of the risky road when the state is favorable would make experimentation
no longer incentive compatible. We characterize the optimal incentive compatible
recommendation system, first in a two-stage game and then in an infinite-horizon
setting. In both cases, this system induces only partial, rather than full, information
sharing among the agents (otherwise there would be too much exploitation of the risky
road when costs there are low).
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1 Introduction
Road conditions and congestion, which determine drivers’ travel times, can change un-
predictably due to accidents, traffic jams, construction, and weather conditions. GPS
technology and smartphone routing applications such as Waze and Google Maps promise
to provide information to drivers (agents) about real-time road conditions and congestion
levels to reduce travel times. These technologies, however, depend on real-time accurate
information from drivers on the road. This introduces an exploration-exploitation trade-
off: the central planner (CP) or the routing applications need to send some drivers to roads
with unknown and unfavorable conditions to obtain up-to-date information. In contrast
to standard experimentation models, the choices of the CP are constrained by incentive
compatibility of the agents: a driver will only experiment if he (or she) expects to later
benefit from the information he obtains now. This will typically necessitate other drivers
not to have full information, since otherwise they would also equally benefit by using the
better road and in the process cause congestion for the experimenter.
We investigate these issues by developing a two-road dynamic routing model with
congestion and a finite number of (atomic) forward-looking agents (drivers). We analyze
this model first in a two-stage setting and then turn to an infinite-horizon setting where
the condition of the risky road changes according to a two-state Markov chain. In this
environment we characterize the optimal incentive compatible recommendation system
for the CP. Incentive compatibility requires that experimenters be rewarded, which means
that the roads they will be using in the future should not be too congested. This is the
reason why the social planner cannot induce full information among drivers (for example,
by sharing the exact road conditions), since this would make non-experimenters also take
the best roads, leading to excessive congestion for the experimenters. There is another
aspect to incentive compatibility, however. Non-experimenters need to receive sufficient
utility from following the recommendations of the CP, otherwise they may deviate from the
recommendations, increasing congestion and also reducing the rewards to experimentation.
These two aspects tightly bound the number of agents that the CP can send to the risky
road after seeing favorable conditions, to both guarantee that experimenters are rewarded
and non-experimenters would not want to deviate.
More formally, we assume that for the safe road travel time depends on the flow via
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a known affine function. For the risky road travel time is a linear function of the flow
with unknown stochastic congestion coefficient, θ. Each agent minimizes his discounted
travel time, while the CP minimizes the sum of all discounted travel times. When there is
experimentation (meaning that some agent is using the risky road) the CP learns the state
of the road (i.e. the congestion coefficient) at that time, and then makes recommendations
to all agents on the basis of this information. Agents themselves learn the state of the
risky road if they take it; otherwise they rely on the recommendations sent by the CP and
their observations of the flows to form beliefs.
We first fully characterize the optimal incentive compatible recommendation system
in a two-stage game where the state of the risky road θ is either low (L) or high (H), and
remains constant over time. This state θ is unknown to both the CP and all the agents
at the beginning of the first stage. Under full information all agents will learn θ before
the second stage (as long as at least one agent takes the risky road in the first stage), and
we show that this leads to insufficient incentives for experimentation. We then establish
that pure private information (where only the experimenters know the state of the risky
road) generates lower average travel times than full information, under some priors. This
is because private information encourages experimentation. We then characterize the
optimal recommendation system, which induces partial information, meaning that the CP
recommends the use of the risky road when its conditions are good to some of the non-
experimenters. This is beneficial for reducing their travel time, while still maintaining the
incentive compatibility of experimentation.
We then extend our model to an infinite-horizon setting. In this case we assume the
state of the risky road changes at each stage of the game according to an underlying
Markov chain (θt ∈ {L,H}). This framework could model potential lane closures that
persist over time, for example due to construction, or multi-day events. We show that
our general insights from the two-stage model generalize to this more complex setting.
A new challenge in this case is that the CP must account for the knowledge that users
infer based on their observations of others actions. For example, an agent on safe that
sees many agents switching to risky can infer that that risky road was low at the previous
round and will therefore be low again with high probability (depending on the underlying
transition probabilities). The CP must consider the agents’ ability to infer information
with one step delay and mitigate the possible deviations agents may take to improve their
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cost. We characterize an incentive compatible recommendation scheme that leads to better
social cost than full information and we study optimality of such scheme under different
assumptions. We again find that the CP must balance the amount of information it shares
with agents to account for both efficiency and incentive compatibility.
1.1 Related Literature
A classic example of exploration-exploitation trade off is given by the multi-armed bandit
(MAB) problem. The seminal analysis of Gittins (1979) focuses on the case of a single
forward-looking agent that can choose between different arms with unknown reward dis-
tributions. This introduces an experimentation-exploitation trade-off for the agent as he
decides which arm to pull in order both to see rewards and improve his information for
the future.
A large literature has been devoted to extend the MAB model to different settings.
Among these works, the most closely related to ours are the works of Bolton and Harris
(1999) and Keller et al. (2005), where multiple experimenters can learn from one another.
These papers show that because of free riding by agents there will be less experimentation
than in the standard MAB model since agents can learn from the effort of others. Our
setting is different because of three features: first, congestion creates dependent payoffs
across agents; second, we focus on the incentive compatible experimentation scheme for a
central planner; and third, information in our setting is neither public (as in Bolton and
Harris (1999) and Keller et al. (2005)) nor fully private, since the recommendation system
will share some of the information the CP acquires.
Previous results have shown that, at least for static settings, providing public infor-
mation in routing games is not necessarily socially optimal, as detailed in Acemoglu et al.
(2018) and Liu et al. (2016). For example, Acemoglu et al. (2018) show that, under certain
conditions, increasing the information of a subset of agents can make these agents worse
off. These results motivate us in considering different models of information sharing. To
this end, we introduce a central planner (CP) that controls the provision of information
between agents.
Our setting is also related to models of Bayesian persuasion, see for example Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011) and Bergemann and Morris (2016). This framework has been applied
to study static traffic problems in Das et al. (2017); Tavafoghi and Teneketzis (2017);
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Lotfi et al. (2018); Wu and Amin (2019), social information sharing in Li et al. (2017)
and competition among multiple information providers in Tavafoghi et al. (2019). The
key difference between these works and our paper is that we consider a dynamic problem
where: i) the game is dynamic and agents, as well as the CP, are forward looking, ii) agents
influence each other payoff functions because of congestion effects, iii) the parameters
underlying the game change over time, requiring constant experimentation and iv) the
CP depends on agents to gain information through experimentation and thus has an
informational advantage only over agents that did not experiment.
The closest works to ours are Tavafoghi and Teneketzis (2017) and Li et al. (2018).
Tavafoghi and Teneketzis (2017) consider a two-stage, two-road routing problem. Therein
however the CP has perfect information about the state of the risky road and does not
need to rely on agents experimentation. As a consequence, Tavafoghi and Teneketzis
(2017) focus on the case of non-atomic agents, while we consider atomic (a finite number
of) agents, which implies that agents take into account the information they generate for
their own and others’ future use. In addition, observations of traffic flow in Tavafoghi and
Teneketzis (2017) are fully revealing, while in our setting there is a one step delay due
to the fact that the CP’s suggestions are based on previous observations and not on the
current state of the risky road (which is unknown to the CP). As already noted, we also
extend our analysis beyond two stages by looking at an infinite horizon model where the
state of the road changes in time. Li et al. (2018) consider a repeated game, again in a
non-atomic setting where the CP does learn from agents’ actions, but agents themselves
are not learning – agents at each time step only use the public message that is sent by the
CP to make a myopic routing decision.
On a more general note, our results contribute to a growing literature on social learning.
For example, Che and Ho¨rner (2015) and Che and Ho¨rner (2017) study how a recommender
system may incentivize users to learn collaboratively on a product, Shah et al. (2018)
study how correlated preferences between agents may effect learning, Johari et al. (2016)
study a matching problem between heterogeneous jobs and workers, where the aim is to
learn worker types, Iyer et al. (2014) study learning in repeated auctions, Bistritz and
Anastasopoulos (2018) study product adoption. A recent survey of the literature at the
interface of learning, experimentation and information design can be found in Ho¨rner and
Skrzypacz (2016). The main feature distinguishing the routing problem addressed in our
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work and the applications considered in the works above is the presence of dependent
payoffs because of congestion effects, which fundamentally modify the results since agents
do not only affect each other in their learning process but also in the received payoffs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the routing
model. In Section 3 we consider a two-stage setting, compare full information, private
information, and partial information and explain how to characterize the optimal recom-
mendation scheme. Finally, in Section 4 we detail the infinite time horizon setting and
study the optimal, incentive compatible recommendation scheme. All proofs are given in
the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a central planner (CP) aims
to minimize total travel time in a repeated routing game with N (atomic) agents on two
roads. Agents decide their own routing to minimize their own travel time, and the CP
can try to influence their choices by providing information.
Congestion model
We consider a network with two roads. One of the roads, the safe road, has a congestion-
dependent but non-stochastic affine cost S0 +S1(N −xR) where S0 > 0, S1 ≥ 0 and xR is
the number of agents on the risky road. The other road, the risky road, has a linear cost
θtxR where θt ∈ {L,H} (where L,H are scalars with L,H > 0) is an unknown congestion
parameter that changes over time according to an underlying Markov chain with switching
probabilities γL := P(θt = H|θt−1 = L) and γH := P(θt = L|θt−1 = H).1 The parameter
θt = L represents cases where the congestion parameter is “low” which means the risky
road is favorable, alternatively θt = H means the parameter is “high” and the safe road
is preferable.
Assumption 1 (Frequency of switching)
0 ≤ γL, γH ≤ 1
2
.
1Our analysis can be easily generalized to a risky road with affine cost θtxR + R0 for known R0 ≥ 0.
We omit this for simplicity of exposition.
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Assumption 1 imposes an upper limit on the probability that the road condition changes.
Intuitively this condition suggests that it might be worthwhile for an agent to experiment,
since the road is likely to remain in the same condition for more than one stage.
Agent actions and stage cost function
At each time t, each agent i chooses an action αit ∈ {S,R} corresponding to either taking
the safe (αit = S) or the risky road (α
i
t = R). An agent’s realized stage cost is then given
by the travel time he experiences at stage t
g˜(αit, α
−i
t , θt) =

S0 + S1(N − xRt (αt)) if αit = S,
θtx
R
t (αt) if α
i
t = R,
where xRt (αt) :=
∑N
i=1 1{αit = R} is the total flow on the risky road at time t.
Information structure
We assume that if an agent experiments by using the risky road at time t, he observes the
true value of θt and this is also directly observed by the CP (because he communicates
it truthfully to the CP or because of direct observation of his experience by the CP via
GPS). Consequently the CP knows θt if and only if at least one agent takes the risky road
at time t. Before t = 0, the CP commits to a signaling scheme to disseminate information
to agents that are on the safe road and are thus uninformed. From here on we restrict our
attention to recommendation schemes, which are a specific type of signaling scheme where
the signal sent to each agent is a recommendation to take either the safe (rS) or the risky
road (rR) and we refer to such a recommendation scheme as pi.
2
Cost function
Drivers are homogeneous and risk-neutral. Each minimizes his expected sum of travel
times over T repetitions of the game discounted in time by a factor δ ∈ [0, 1). Let hit−1 be
agent i’s history after round t− 1 and before time t (based on his observations and on the
signals sent by the CP). This includes the past actions of the agent, the flows the agent
experienced, the recommendations the agent received, and the state of the risky road for
2A formal definition of recommendation schemes for the two stage model is given in Definition 2 and
for the infinite horizon model is given in Definition 3.
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those times the agent took it. An agent’s strategy ξit(h
i
t−1) maps any history to an action
{S,R}. The agent’s expected cost from time t to time T is given by
uit(h
i
t−1) = E
[
T∑
k=t
δk−tg˜(ξik(h
i
k−1), ξ
−i
k (h
−i
k−1), θk)
]
.
We focus on pure strategies; hence the expectation here is on the state of the risky road
θ and on the information received from the CP.
Each agent chooses ξit(·) to minimize his total expected cost given the strategies of
others and the recommendation scheme the CP uses. Note that the agent’s strategy is
chosen after the CP has committed to a recommendation scheme.
The CP’s objective is to select a recommendation scheme pi to minimize the expected
total discounted travel times of agents over T stages. Let ξ
i|pi
t be the strategy agent i uses
in equilibrium under the recommendation scheme pi.
Definition 1 A recommendation scheme pi is incentive compatible if ξ
i|pi
t = R for any
agent i that receives a recommendation rR for stage t and ξ
i|pi
t = S for any agent i that
receives a recommendation rS for stage t.
Let Π be the class of incentive compatible recommendation schemes and g(xR, θ) be
the total cost of a stage when there are xR agents on the risky road and the road condition
is θ, i.e.
g(xR, θ) = θ(xR)2 + (S0 + S1(N − xR))(N − xR).
If no agent is using the risky road, we define g(0) = (S0 + S1N)N as the cost does not
depend on θ. Before the game begins the CP and all agents share a common prior on the
state of the risky road which we denote by β = P(θ0 = L). The CP wants to choose a
scheme pi ∈ Π to minimize
V piT (β) := E
[
T∑
k=1
δkg(xRk , θk) | P[θ0 = L] = β
]
, where xRk =
N∑
i=1
1{ξi|pik (hik−1) = R}.
(2.1)
3 The two-stage model
We start by considering a two-stage model (T = 2) and, for simplicity, we assume that
the road condition does not change between the two stages, that is θ0 = θ1 = θ2 =: θ (i.e.
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γH = γL = 0). We also assume no discounting (δ = 1) to simplify the derived bounds.
Define the expected value of θ at the beginning of the first stage as
µβ := E[θ] = βL+ (1− β)H.
In this context the objective of the CP is to minimize
V pi2 (β) := E
[
g(xR1 , θ) + g(x
R
2 , θ) | P(θ = L) = β
]
.
We adopt the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Two stage model) The parameters are such that
1. L < S0 + S1,
2. S0 + S1N < µβ.
Assumption 2.1 states that if the congestion parameter is L, the risky road is preferable
(i.e. the cost of one agent on risky if θ = L is less than the cost of one agent on safe).
Assumption 2.2 states that the expected cost of experimentation for one agent µβ is greater
than a fully congested safe road. Note that agents may nonetheless select the risky road
in the first round since, if θ = L, they can exploit this information in the second round.
We let xeqL be the myopic equilibrium flow on risky if all agents know that θ = L.
3
3.1 Full and private information
We start with two extreme and simple informational scenarios:
• Full information - if any agent takes the risky road in round one, then all agents
learn θ before round two.
• Private information - any agent that takes the risky road in round one knows the
value of θ before round two, but any agent that chose to play safe in the first round
has no new information before the beginning of round two.
3That is xeqL ≈min
{
S0+S1N
L+S1
, N
}
. The approximation comes from the fact that xeqL must be an integer
as we work with an atomic model (finite number of agents).
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We first show that in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium, at most one agent exper-
iments in the first round. We then use this result to characterize the equilibrium under
both full and private information. While the result that only one agent experiments under
full information is very general, the fact that only one agent experiments under private
information is a consequence of some of the special features of this example. In particular,
in a two-period model, there is only a limited time during which an experimenter can ex-
ploit his information. Since we assume a linear cost function, an additional experimenter
increases the travel time sufficiently such that it is not worthwhile for two agents to ex-
periment. This result does not apply, for example, in our infinite-horizon model, studied
in the next section. Nevertheless, we will see that, in that setting too, in the incentive
compatible optimal mechanism, the CP will induce only one agent to experiment.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2 and any information scheme, in any pure strategy Nash
equilibrium at most one agent experiments in the first round.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 2 the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is as follows:4
• Full information:
– all agents play safe in both rounds, if
β <
H − (S0 + S1N)
H − L+ (S0 + S1N)− g(x
eq
L ,L)
N
=: βf
– otherwise, one agent experiments in the first round, and xeqL agents use the risky
road in the second round if θ = L, and all play safe if θ = H.
The expected cost under equilibrium is
V full2 (β) :=

2g(0) if β < βf
g(1, µβ) + βg(x
eq
L , L) + (1− β)g(0) if βf ≤ β.
• Private information:
– all agents play safe in both rounds if
β <
H − (S0 + S1N)
H + (S0 + S1N)− 2L =: βp ≤ βf
4Uniqueness here refers to the total number of agents in each road.
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– otherwise, one agent experiments in the first round and uses the risky road if
θ = L and the safe road if θ = H in the second round. All other agents play
safe in both rounds.
The expected cost under equilibrium is
V private2 (β) :=

2g(0) if β < βp
g(1, µβ) + βg(1, L) + (1− β)g(0) if βp ≤ β.
Corollary 1 If the prior belief β is such that
βp ≤ β < βf , (3.1)
then in the pure strategy equilibrium there is experimentation under private information,
but not under full information. Consequently private information has a lower expected
cost (V private2 (β) < V
full
2 (β)).
According to the above corollary, there may exist a range of priors where it is better for
the CP to provide no information rather than full information. Intuitively, this happens
because providing the information that θ = L to all the agents induces congestion in the
second round, thus reducing the value of information. This decreases the incentive of an
agent to experiment in the first round. In other words, full information allows more agents
to free-ride off one agent’s experimentation, reducing the payoff of the experimenter due
to congestion effects. The next example illustrates the costs as a function of the prior
belief.
Example 1 Suppose N = 40, S0 = 10, S1 = 1, L = 0.9, and H = 150. The comparison of
the equilibrium cost for all beliefs satisfying Assumption 2 is shown in Figure 1. For β ∈
[0.50, 0.57], there is experimentation under private information, but no experimentation
under full information.
The fact that full information, where the conditions of the risky road are communicated
to all agents, is not socially optimal motivates the rest of our analysis. We will show that
some amount of information sharing by the CP is preferable to private information and
characterize the optimal recommendation scheme.
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3.2 Unconstrained social optimum
Define xSOL , x
SO
H as the social optimum integer myopic flows on the risky road when it is
known that θ = L or θ = H respectively, that is,
xSOL := argmin
x∈{0,1,...,N}
g(x, L), xSOH := argmin
x∈{0,1,...,N}
g(x,H).
Theorem 2 Under Assumption 2 the social optimum is given by
• All agents playing safe in both rounds, if
β ≤ H + g(x
SO
H , H)− (S0(N + 1)− S1((2 +N)N − 1))
H − L+ g(xSOH , H)− g(xSOL , L)
:= βSO ≤ βp
• One agent experimenting in the first round and xSOL (xSOH ) agents taking the risky
road in the second round if θ = L (θ = H), otherwise.
The expected cost under the social optimum is then
V ∗2 :=

2g(0) if β < βSO,
g(1, µβ) + βg(x
SO
L , L) + (1− β)g(xSOH , H) if β ≥ βSO.
Remark 1 Two remarks are in order. First, note that while when θ = H it is never
myopically a best response for an agent to take the risky road, the previous lemma shows
that the CP may still want to send some agents to the risky road in the second round (if
xSOH ≥ 1) to reduce congestion on safe for all other agents. Second, note that at least for
any belief β ∈ [βSO, βp) the social optimum scheme is not incentive compatible. In fact,
since β < βp it is not incentive compatible for an agent to experiment in the first round
(under private information the experimenter has the highest possible gain from experi-
mentation hence if experimentation doesn’t happen under private information it cannot
happen under any information scheme). Nonetheless, for β > βSO the CP would like to
experiment by sending one agent to the risky road (because knowing the state of the road
is collectively beneficial). In Example 1, βSO = 0.05 is significantly lower than βp = 0.50
suggesting that the social optimum may not be incentive compatible for a large range of
beliefs.
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Figure 1: Example 1. We distinguish four cases based on the prior β: A) no experimen-
tation, B) experimentation under social optimum, C) experimentation under private and
optimal information, D) experimentation under all schemes.
3.3 Partial information
The CP can alleviate the problems of full and private information and achieve a cost that
is closer to social optimum by providing recommendations in a coordinated way. The
objective here is to find a balance between
• providing information to a large enough number of agents in the second stage, so
that the total cost is low when θ = L;
• providing information to a small enough number of agents in the second stage to
avoid a high level of congestion on the risky road when θ = L to encourage experi-
mentation in the first round.
We refine the CP’s recommendation scheme for the two stage model as follows.
Definition 2 (Two stage recommendation scheme) In the two stage model, a de-
terministic recommendation scheme is a pair of mappings (pi1, pi2) where pit : {β} →
{0, 1, ..., N} maps the CP’s belief on the state of the risky road at time t to the number
pit(β) of uninformed agents to whom the CP sends a recommendation of risky before time
t.5 With a slight abuse of notation we let pit(L) := pit(1) and pit(H) := pit(0).
5We assume that the pit(β) agents to which rR is sent are chosen uniformly at random from the set of
uninformed agents.
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Note that this definition restricts attention to recommendation systems that are anony-
mous, in the sense that the recommendations for all agents with the same beliefs (i.e.
agents that took the safe road) are drawn from the same distribution.6 Nevertheless,
the recommendation system is potentially “interim asymmetric” — meaning that some of
these agents may receive different recommendations.7
Because of Lemma 1, in any incentive compatible scheme it must be pi1(β) ≤ 1. We
already argued in Remark 1 that in any incentive compatible scheme there cannot be
experimentation if β < βp, hence in this range it must be pi1(β) = pi2(β) = 0. If instead
β ≥ βp, we show that the optimal incentive compatible scheme selects pi1(β) = 1 and
values of pi2(L), pi2(H) obtained by solving the following quadratic integer program with
quadratic constraints (corresponding to the incentive compatibility constraints).
Theorem 3 If β ≥ βp the optimal incentive compatible recommendation scheme is a
solution to the following minimization problem
min
pi2(L),pi2(H)
g(1, µβ) + βg(x
R|L
2 , L) + (1− β)g(xR|H2 , H) (3.2a)
s.t. Eθ[S0 + S1(N − xR|θ2 ) | rec. safe]︸ ︷︷ ︸
follow rec. of safe
≤ Eθ[θ(xR|θ2 + 1) | rec. safe]︸ ︷︷ ︸
deviate to risky
, (3.2b)
Eθ[θx
R|θ
2 | rec. risky]︸ ︷︷ ︸
follow rec. of risky
≤ Eθ[S0 + S1(N − xR|θ2 + 1) | rec. risky]︸ ︷︷ ︸
deviate to safe
, (3.2c)
E[θ]︸︷︷︸
exp.’s cost
in round 1
+β(Lx
R|L
2 ) + (1− β)(S0 + S1(N − xR|H2 ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
experimenter’s cost
in round 2
≤ 2(S0 + S1N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
all playing safe
in both rounds
(3.2d)
x
R|L
2 = pi2(L) + 1, x
R|H
2 = pi2(H)
pi2(L), pi2(H) ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}
Equations (3.2b), (3.2c) and (3.2d) are given in implicit form for readability, the explicit
form is provided within the proof.
Note, that pi2(L) = pi2(H) = 0 is a feasible solution when β ≥ βp (and corresponds to
6This could also be replicated with a recommendation system that is fully anonymous, meaning that all
agents receive recommendations from the same distribution, but those with beliefs determined from their
experience of the risky road (the experimenters) will not follow these recommendations.
7An alternative is to impose additionally that the scheme is interim symmetric, but mixed. In this case,
all agents would receive the same stochastic recommendation. Because we have a finite number of agents,
this would induce additional noise in traffic flows, hence we do not focus on this case.
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private information). Moreover, if β > βf , pi2(L) = x
eq
L −1, pi2(H) = 0 is a feasible solution
and has the same social cost as full information. Hence private and full information have
always at least weakly higher cost than the optimal incentive compatible scheme. We
show in Example 1 that the optimal incentive compatible scheme can be strictly better
than private and full information (see region C in Figure 1).
4 The infinite-horizon model
We now extend our analysis to an infinite-horizon setting. For simplicity, we restrict our
attention to the case when the safe road has a fixed cost S0 (i.e. we set S1 = 0), so that the
cost under full information is simply S0/(1−δ).8 We first characterize the social optimum
scheme and give an example to illustrate why it may not be incentive compatible. We
then introduce an incentive compatible recommendation system, prove it achieves better
cost than full information and derive conditions for optimality.
4.1 Unconstrained social optimum
We first derive the “unconstrained” social optimal, meaning that we ignore the incentive
compatibility constraints of the agents.
Suppose that the CP has a belief, βt−1 ∈ [0, 1] about the probability that state of the
road at time t− 1 was L (we use the convention βt−1 = 0 if H was observed and βt−1 = 1
if L was observed). If the CP had complete control of the agents the myopically optimal
flow to send at time t under a generic belief βt−1 = β would be
xSOβ := argmin
x∈{0,...,N}
Eθt [g(x, θt) | βt−1 = β] . (4.1)
Note that the myopic flow does not depend on t given the properties of Markov processes.
With a slight abuse of notation we set xSOL := x
SO
1 and x
SO
H := x
SO
0 .
In the following, we focus on cases where the cost of experimentation is high from a
myopic standpoint. Specifically, we consider cases in which xSOH = 0, so that myopically the
8If S1 > 0 a similar argument can be followed to derive an incentive compatible recommendation
scheme. Proving optimality of such a scheme is more complicated, however. The main technical difficulty
in that scenario is computing the optimal punishment for deviations. We show below that, in the case
where S1 =0, the optimal punishment is providing full information. Finally, note that even though the
travel time on the safe road does not depend on congestion levels, we still assume that if an agent takes
safe at time t, he observes xSt .
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CP has no incentive to send agents to the risky road after observing H in the last period.
Our interest is determining conditions under which experimentation happens when the
CP is forward looking.
Assumption 3 (Cost of experimentation) Define the expected value of the congestion
parameter θt, following an observation of θt−1 as
µL := E[θt|θt−1 = L] = (1− γL)L+ γLH,
µH := E[θt|θt−1 = H] = γHL+ (1− γH)H.
We assume that S0 > 3L and
µL ∈ [L, (1/3)S0)
µH ∈
[
S0, S0 + δγH
(
S0
3
− µL
)]
.
Intuitively, Assumption 3 imposes that the expected congestion parameter µL following
an observation of L is small enough such that the CP would myopically send two or more
agents after observing L (that is, xSOL ≥ 2). If this were not the case, then the CP would
send the same flow after L and H making the problem uninteresting. The assumption
also imposes that µH ≥ S0, which implies that the CP would myopically send no agent
after seeing H, thus making experimentation beneficial only because of forward-looking
incentives—there would be no experimentation with myopic agents. Finally, the upper
bound on µH ensures that the forward-looking CP always find experimentation after seeing
H beneficial (rather than sending all agents to safe for one or more rounds).
Proposition 1 (Social optimum) Under Assumptions 1 and 3, xSOH = 0 and x
SO
L ≥ 2.
Let us define the social optimum recommendation scheme as a function piSO that maps the
belief β that the CP has about the state of the road at time t− 1 to the number of agents
to send to the risky road at time t to minimize total discounted travel time, that is,
piSO(β) := argmin
x∈{0,...,N}
E
g(x, θt) +∑
k≥1
δkg
(
piSO(βt−1+k), θt+k
) | P[θt−1 = L] = β
 . (4.2)
Then
piSO(β) = max{1, xSOβ }, (4.3)
with xSOβ as defined in (4.1).
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Under the social optimum recommendation scheme derived above the CP sends one
agent (the experimenter) if the state of the risky road was H at the previous step (to
explore) and xSOL ≥ 2 if it was L (to exploit). Hence, under piSO the CP always knows the
state of the risky road. The next example, however, shows that this scheme is not neces-
sarily incentive compatible. In particular, when agents make their own routing decisions,
the CP may not be able to send xSOL agents when the state is L.
Example 2 Take the extreme case where γL = 0. Then x
SO
L ≈ S02L and xeqL ≈ S0L .9
Suppose that at time t − 1 the risky road state changes from H to L. Since γL = 0 this
will be the state of the risky road from that point forward. According to piSO, at time t, the
CP sends xSOL drivers to risky to exploit the low state. After time t, under pi
SO, agents
that were on risky at time t should remain on risky forever and agents that were on safe
at time t should remain on safe forever.
However, consider an agent on safe at time t. After observing the flow xSOL at time t,
this agent can infer that θ has changed to L. Hence at time t+ 1 he knows that
- if he remains on safe, as prescribed by piSO, he will experience a cost of S0 for all
future times;
- if he switches to risky, he will experience a cost of ≈ L(S02L + 1) = S02 + L for all
future times;
Under Assumption 3, L < S03 <
S0
2 . Hence following pi
SO is not incentive compatible
for the agent.
In the next sections, our objective is to derive incentive compatible recommendation
schemes that achieve lower cost than providing full information.
4.2 Partial information: Incentive compatibility
Example 2 shows that the social optimum scheme piSO may not be incentive compatible
because it does not take into account the fact that agents that are on the safe road can
infer the state θt−2 from the flow observed at time t − 1. For this reason, from here on
we consider recommendation schemes where the CP conditions his recommendations not
9Again, the approximation comes from the integer constraint of our atomic model.
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only on θt−1 but also on θt−2. In principle, the CP could even condition on further past
values of the state θ. Though we are not able to rule out formally that conditioning on
(θt−2, θt−1) is optimal without loss of generality, in what follows we simplify the analysis
of incentive compatible recommendation schemes by assuming that the CP will condition
only on (θt−2, θt−1) and thus the relevant state can be summarized by equilibrium path
beliefs (βt−2, βt−1). Based on Proposition 1, we also restrict attention to schemes which
do involve experimentation for all sample paths (meaning that the CP always prefers to
send one agent on the risky road).
Definition 3 (Infinite horizon recommendation scheme) A recommendation scheme
is defined as a map pi : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ {1, 2, ..., N} which maps the belief of the CP on the
state of the risky road at time t− 2 and t− 1 (i.e. βt−2, βt−1) to the number of agents to
whom the CP sends a recommendation to take the risky road, rR. If θt−1 = L, we assume
that all agents that were on the risky road at time t − 1 receive a recommendation to re-
main on the risky road at time t; the remaining recommendations (i.e. pi(·, L)− xRt−1) are
sent to a random subset of the agents on safe. If instead θt−1 = H then recommendations
are sent to a random subset of all the agents. In both cases agents that do not receive
a recommendation of risky receive a recommendation of safe, rS. Finally, if any agent
deviates, the CP provides full information to all agents from then on.10 We denote the set
of all recommendation schemes of this form as Πˆ.
We want to stress that the assumption of restricted history applies only to the CP, not
to agents. Consequently, we are in no way restricting the optimal behavior of the agents,
who can condition their actions on all of their past information.
Any scheme pi ∈ Πˆ can be parametrized as follows
pi(βt−2, βt−1) =

a if [βt−2, βt−1] = [L,H]
b if [βt−2, βt−1] = [H,H]
c if [βt−2, βt−1] = [H,L]
d if [βt−2, βt−1] = [L,L].
10Intuitively, full information is the worst incentive compatible punishment, for deviation, that the CP
can impose. In fact under full information, the expected cost per round of each agent is S0. No punishment
can lead to higher cost and be incentive compatible because agents can always switch to play safe and
achieve a cost of S0.
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Note that one should also specify the values of pi(βt−2, βt−1) for values of β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1)
but in the schemes we consider this is not relevant in view of the fact that the CP always
sends at least one agent to experiment and thus knows the state of the risky road in
the previous period. For simplicity we denote a generic scheme pi of this form as pia,b,c,d
and the associated social cost as Va,b,c,d (we consider costs starting from θ0 = H since
this choice induces the lowest possible belief and is thus the most difficult scenario for
experimentation).
Example 2 showed that piSO may not be incentive compatible because if agents on the
safe road see the flow N−xSOL they can infer that the road switched to L at time t−2 and
may have an incentive to deviate. This intuition motivates us to focus in particular on a
subclass of Πˆ consisting of schemes obtained by the following modification of the social
optimum policy (see also Table 1). If θt−1 = H the CP sends one agent (to experiment)
exactly as in the social optimum (i.e. we set a = b = 1). If instead θt−1 = L then the
CP sends two possibly different flows c and d depending on whether the road has just
switched to L or whether it was L also in the previous period (in which case the agents
on safe can infer the road changed at time t− 2 from the flow observed at t− 1).
Definition 4 Consider a scheme pia,b,c,d ∈ Πˆ with a = b = 1 and 1 < c ≤ d and denote
this for simplicity as pic,d.
Since c > 1, under any scheme pic,d, agents can learn the state of the risky road at t−2
by observing the flow at t − 1. Exploiting this fact, we show that agents can summarize
their history ht−1 with a smaller state zit, as detailed next.
Lemma 2 Under pic,d and given that other agents follow their recommendations, an agent
can evaluate if a recommendation is incentive compatible using only the information
zit := [xt−1, β
i
t−1, r
i
t−1]
where
• xt−1 ∈ X := {0, 1, ..., N} is the flow observed on the risky road at the previous time
(even if an agent is on safe he can infer xt−1 as N minus the flow on safe, hence
this is common information);
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• βit−1 ∈ B := {L,H,U} encodes the information that agent i has about the state of
the road at t− 1. If the agent was on the risky road at t− 1, then he knows the true
realization (L or H), while if he was on the safe road we denote the fact that he does
not know the state with the symbol U (Unobserved);11
• rit−1 ∈ Λ := {rS , rR} is the recommendation an agent receives between round t − 1
and t.
Specifically, let hit−1 be the entire history of the agent up to and including time t− 1.
For any αit ∈ {S,R} it holds
E
[
g˜(αit, pi
−i,t
c,d , θt) +
∞∑
k=t+1
δk−tg˜(pii,kc,d, pi
−i,k
c,d , θk) | hit−1
]
= E
[
g˜(αit, pi
−i,t
c,d , θt) +
∞∑
k=t+1
δk−tg˜(pii,kc,d, pi
−i,k
c,d , θk) | zit
]
where pii,kc,d is the recommendation sent at time k > t by the CP if agent i takes action
αit at time t and follows the recommendations from there on, while pi
−i,k
c,d denotes the
recommendations sent to all other agents.
Intuitively, the flow xt−1 is a summary of all that happened up to θt−2 (this is common
information) and the combination of βit−1 and rit−1 adds personalized information about
an agent’s knowledge of θt−1 before time t. Note that if road congestion were unobserved
(U), under pic,d the combination of xt−1 and rit−1 would be enough to provide a unique
belief on the state of the risky road. That is any agents with the same state zjt = z
i
t have
the same belief on the state of the risky road.
Our first main result is to derive sufficient conditions on c, d so that pic,d is incentive
compatible.
Proposition 2 (Symmetric equilibrium) Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold.
Additionally, assume that c, d are such that
1. xSOL ≤ c ≤ d ≤ xeqL
2. g(c, µL) ≤ g(2, µL)
11We simply use the symbol U instead of specifying the belief with a number in (0, 1).
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3. the pair (c, d) is such that agents that are on safe and receive a recommendation of
rS after observing flow d on risky will follow the recommendation, that is,
u([d, U, rS ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of following
≤ pd,SµL(d+ 1) + (1− pd,S)2µH︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected stage cost of deviating
to risky
+
δ
1− δS0︸ ︷︷ ︸
continuation cost
of deviating
(4.4)
where pd,S = P(θt−1 = L | zit = [d, U, rS ]). The constraint (4.4) is written implicitly
for readability and an explicit formula is provided in (B.14) in the Appendix.
Then, the recommendation scheme pic,d induces the symmetric equilibrium
ξipic,d(z
i
t) = ξ
i
pic,d
([xt−1, βit−1, r
i
t−1]) =

R if rit−1 = rR,
S otherwise,
(4.5)
and is thus incentive compatible.
The intuition behind the conditions derived in the Proposition 2 are given next:
1. after the road switches to L for the first time the CP sends at least the social optimum
number of agents and he possibly increases the flow after that, but no more than
the myopic equilibrium flow;
2. the flow sent by the CP on the risky road after the road switches to L for the first
time leads to a no worse stage cost than sending just two agents;
3. d is large enough so that agents that are on safe and infer θt−2 = L follow the rec-
ommendation to remain on safe (thus addressing the issue identified in Example 2).
The proof of Proposition 2 is presented in the Appendix. Here we provide some
intuition. The first fundamental observation that we make is that, since the experimenter
after θt−1 = H is chosen at random among all the agents, each agent has the same
continuation cost (which we term v¯) after he observes the risky road switching from L
to H. Because of this we can divide the infinite horizon into periods (by defining the
beginning of a new period as the time immediately after the risky road switches from L
to H) and study incentive compatibility only until the end of the current period. The
division in periods and the number of agents taking the risky road under the schemes piSO
and pic,d for each period are illustrated in Table 1.
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. . . LH|H . . .HL . . . LH︸ ︷︷ ︸
period
|H . . .HL . . . LH︸ ︷︷ ︸
period
|H . . .HL . . . LH︸ ︷︷ ︸
period
|H . . .HL . . . LH︸ ︷︷ ︸
period
|H . . .
State of the risky road H H . . . H L L L . . . L H
piSO (Social optimum) - 1 . . . 1 1 xSOL x
SO
L . . . x
SO
L x
SO
L
pic,d (Proposition 2) - 1 . . . 1 1 c d . . . d d
Table 1: Comparison between the flows on the risky road under schemes piSO and pic,d for
one period.
To prove incentive compatibility of pic,d we then need to show that no agent can improve
his cost by a unilateral deviation. To this end, we divide the agents into four types:
1. Agents that took the risky road at time t− 1 and saw L: under pic,d these agents
receive a recommendation of risky. Since the probability that the road changes from
L to H in one step is γL ≤ 12 , one should expect that following such a recommen-
dation is incentive compatible. In particular, we show that the stage cost obtained
by following the recommendation is less than S0 (as proven in Lemma 7 in the Ap-
pendix), hence any deviation will increase both current cost and also continuation
cost (because it leads to lower information than using the risky road and is thus not
profitable).
2. that took the risky road at time t− 1 and saw H: there are two cases, either the
agent receives a recommendation to take the safe road (which is intuitively incentive
compatible since the probability that the road changes from H to L in one step is
γH ≤ 12) or the agent receives a recommendation to take the risky road. The only
case when the latter happens is if the agent is selected to be the next experimenter.
In this case we show that, even though experimentation is costly in terms of current
payoffs, the continuation cost is lower from experimenting than from deviating (recall
that after any deviation the CP provides full information in all future periods). This
makes being the experimenter incentive compatible.
3. Agents that took the safe road at time t− 1 and received a recommendation to
remain on the safe road: as noted in Example 2 from observing xt−1 = c > 1
or xt−1 = d > 1 these agents can infer θt−2 = L. Condition (4.4) guarantees it is
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incentive compatible for an agent that observed xt−1 = d to follow a recommendation
of using the safe road. We show that this condition implies incentive compatibility
also for the case xt−1 = c. The only remaining possibility is when xt−1 = 1, in this
case the agent can infer θt−2 = H and incentive compatibility is immediate.
4. Agents that took the safe road at time t− 1 and received a recommendation to take
the risky road: incentive compatibility in this case follows with the same argument
as in cases 1 and 2. Indeed, the agent has either been chosen to benefit from using
the risky road when the state is L (which is incentive compatible by the discussion
for case 1) or he has been chosen as an experimenter (which is incentive compatible
by the discussion for case 2).
4.3 Partial information: Optimality
Motivated by Example 2, we consider a specific scheme among those that are incentive
compatible according to Proposition 2. Specifically, for the period immediately after the
road switched from H to L we assume that the CP sends the flow c = xSOL exactly as in the
social optimum (intuitively this is possible, because agents on safe are unaware that the
road condition changed). For all subsequent periods the CP sends the minimum number
of agents to maintain incentive compatibility (i.e. to satisfy (4.4) for c = xSOL ). We denote
this flow by xLL.
Definition 5 We define the scheme pi∗ ∈ Πˆ as follows
pi∗(βt−2, βt−1) =

1 if βt−1 = H,
xSOL if βt−2 = H,βt−1 = L,
xLL if βt−2 = L, βt−1 = L,
(4.6)
where xLL := max{xSOL , x¯LL} with x¯LL being the smallest integer such that d = x¯LL
satisfies (4.4) for c = xSOL . In other words, pi
∗ = pi(xSOL ,xLL).
Corollary 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. The scheme pi∗ ∈ Πˆ is incentive
compatible and achieves strictly lower social cost than full information.
This corollary follows immediately from Proposition 2 upon noting that the pair c =
xSOL and d = xLL satisfy the assumptions of that proposition (we prove in Lemma 11
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in the Appendix that x¯LL ≤ xeqL ). The fact that the social cost is strictly less than full
information is proven in point 1 of Lemma 8 (in the Appendix).
We next derive sufficient conditions for the scheme pi∗ to be not only incentive com-
patible, but also optimal. We consider two different regimes depending on the discount
factor δ used by the agents to weight future travel times.
4.3.1 Large δ
We show that as δ → 1, xLL → xSOL . In other words, the cost under pi∗ converges to the
cost of the social optimum as δ → 1. Define the social cost starting from belief β = H
under the social optimum and pi∗ as V SOH and V
pi∗
H , respectively.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold and assume γH , γL > 0. Then
the cost under pi∗ approaches the social optimum as δ → 1. Formally,
lim
δ→1
V pi
∗
H
V SOH
= 1.
This full optimality result obtains because for large δ the policy pi(c,d) = pi(xSOL ,x
SO
L )
satisfies (4.4) hence pi∗ coincides with piSO. This result is to be expected. In fact given
any time t let tH be the first time the road switches to θ = H after t (this event happens
in finite time since γL > 0). Then under any policy pi(c,d), the cost of any agent is
tH∑
τ=t+1
δτ−tcostτ + δτ−tH
V
pi(c,d)
H
N
.
For δ → 1 the first term is negligible; hence any scheme for which V piH < S0N/(1− δ) (i.e.
the cost under full information) is incentive compatible. Clearly the social optimum meets
this condition and hence it must be incentive compatible.
4.3.2 Small δ
Before stating our main result we show that for δ small, for any scheme pi ∈ Πˆ to be
incentive compatible it must be a = b = 1 (thus justifying our interest in the class of
schemes given in Definition 4).
Lemma 3 Suppose that δ ≤ 12 and that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then if a scheme
pi ∈ Πˆ is incentive compatible it must be a = b = 1.
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The intuition for this result is straightforward. Since, after seeing H, the CP selects
the next experimenter randomly, in any scheme pi there is a positive probability that the
selected experimenter knows that the risky road was H in the previous period. If either a
or b are greater than one, then the expected cost of the experimenter would be greater than
2µH (which is the expected stage cost). On the other hand, if the experimenter deviates,
the CP provides full information and can guarantee an expected cost of S01−δ from then on.
Under Assumption 3, and if δ ≤ 12 ,
S0
1− δ ≤ 2S0 ≤ 2µH .
Hence having more than one experimenter cannot be incentive compatible.12 Having fixed
a, b we now turn to the optimal choice of c, d.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold and N ≥ 5. Then
1. for δ sufficiently small, pi∗ achieves the minimum social cost among all the incentive
compatible schemes belonging to Πˆ;
2. for δ ≤ 12 , the scheme that minimizes the social cost among all the incentive com-
patible schemes belonging to Πˆ is either pi∗ or p˜i∗ := pixSOL +1,xLL−1.
To understand the previous result recall that the social optimum choice would be
c = d = xSOL . Unfortunately, in most cases this choice is not incentive compatible because
of constraint (4.4) (guaranteeing that agents that are on safe follow a recommendation of
safe). Our first step in the proof of Proposition 4 is to show that the incentive compatibility
constraint (4.4) can be rewritten as f(c) ≤ g(d) where f(c) is convex in c and is minimized
at a value between xSOL and x
SO
L +1. By the integer nature of our problem, this immediately
implies that at optimality c should take one of this two values (for having a larger value
of c would make the constraint (4.4) harder to satisfy (leading to d ≥ xLL) and would
12We note that instead if δ > 1
2
, a scheme with a or b greater than one, might be incentive compatible.
Although, sending more than one agent to experiment always gives a higher stage cost for the CP, it is
unclear under higher δ whether it may benefit the CP to send a higher flow after H to drive down d either
through raising the cost of deviation in this setting or through obfuscation of information by making the
flow the same after H and L. Overall, when δ > 1
2
we are unable to rule out that a scheme sending more
than one agent to experiment could be incentive compatible and give a lower overall cost.
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thus lead to a scheme with higher social cost than pi∗; recall that c = xSOL would be the
optimal choice to minimize the social cost).
If the minimizer is c = xSOL , then by definition it must be d ≥ xLL. If, instead,
c = xSOL + 1 is the minimizer then there exist parameters under which d = xLL − 1 can
be incentive compatible (but we show that no smaller values of d could be).13 The pair
c = xSOL + 1 and d = xLL − 1, defining p˜i∗, may give a lower social cost than pi∗ for
certain parameter values (because there are more future rounds with flow d in expectation
than rounds with c, hence increasing c slightly to decrease d may be beneficial).14 The
second statement of Proposition 4 follows immediately from these observations. The first
statement follows from the observation that, for δ small enough, the scheme pi∗ must have
smaller social cost than p˜i∗ (since it leads to smaller cost for the stage immediately after
the state of the road switches to L, and for δ small enough, this dominates the potential
future gain of using d = xLL − 1 instead of d = xLL).
5 Conclusion
New GPS technologies and traffic recommendation systems critically depend on real-time
information about road conditions and delays on a large number of routes. This informa-
tion mainly comes from the experiences of drivers. Consequently, enough drivers have to
be induced to experiment with different roads (even if this involves worse expected travel
times for them). This situation creates a classic experimentation-exploitation trade-off,
but critically one in which the party interested in acquiring new information cannot di-
rectly choose to experiment but has to convince selfish, autonomous agents to do it. This
is the problem we investigate in the current paper.
There is by now a large literature on experimentation in economics and operations
research. The main focus is on the optimal amount of experimentation by trying new or
less well-known options in order to acquire information at the expense of foregoing cur-
13In fact, in some cases increasing the value of c leads to a smaller continuation cost for agents that
follow the recommendation of safe (since they have higher probability to be sent to the risky road when the
road changes to L in the next period). When that happens p˜i∗ is incentive compatible by Proposition 2.
14While p˜i∗ has a higher cost that pi∗ immediately after the road switches to L (since g(xSOL + 1, µL) >
g(xSOL , µL)), it has lower stage cost for all the subsequent times (since g(xLL − 1, µL) < g(xLL, µL)). For
sufficiently large values of δ this may reduce the overall cost.
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rent high payoffs. The game theoretic experimentation literature, investigating situations
where there are multiple agents who can generate information for themselves and others,
studies issues of collective learning, free-riding and underexperimentation. Missing from
the previous literature is the main focus of our paper: a setting in which exploitation of
relevant information creates payoff dependence (for example, via congestion in the context
of our routing model) and the central entity or planner has the incentives for experimen-
tation, but has to confront the incentive compatibility of the agents, especially in view of
the aforementioned payoff dependence.
We develop a simple model to study these issues, and characterize optimal recommen-
dation systems first in a two-stage setting and then in an infinite-horizon environment.
Key aspects of our model are congestion externalities on roads (introducing payoff de-
pendence); a finite number of agents (so that agents take into account their impact on
information as well as congestion); forward-looking behavior by agents (so that they can
be incentivized by future rewards); and a central planner who can observe results from ex-
perimentation and can make recommendations but has to respect incentive compatibility
(introducing the feature that this is not a direct model of experimentation). We simplify
our analysis by assuming that there are only two roads and one of them is “safe”, meaning
that the travel time is known, non-stochastic, and does not depend on the state of nature.
This contrasts with the other, “risky” road, where travel times depend on the state of
nature (on which the central planner is acquiring information).
We first show that full information, whereby the central planner shares all the infor-
mation he acquires with all agents, is generally not optimal. The reason is instructive
about the forces in our model: full information will make all agents exploit information
about favorable conditions on the risky road, and this will in turn cause congestion on
this risky road, reducing the rewards the experimenter would need to reap in order to
encourage his experimentation. As a result, full information may lead to insufficient or no
experimentation, which is socially costly.
We then proceed to characterizing optimal incentive compatible recommendation schemes.
These typically do not induce full information, but still share some of the information ob-
tained from the experimentation of few experimenters (in our model only one experimenter
is sufficient because there is no uncertainty about the state conditional on experimenta-
tion).
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In the case of infinite-horizon, the underlying state of the risky road changes according
to a Markov chain. An additional issue in this case is that the incentive compatibility
of non-informed agents has to be ensured as well, since they may decide to disregard the
recommendation of the central planner and choose the risky road when they think travel
times are lower there. This makes the characterization of the optimal recommendation
scheme more challenging. We propose a relatively simple incentive compatible dynamic
scheme and then establish its optimality when the discount factor is small (in particular
less than 1/2) and large enough (limiting to 1).
Our paper highlights the importance of understanding how modern routing technolo-
gies (and perhaps more generally) need to induce sufficient experimentation and how they
can balance the benefits from exploiting new information and ensuring incentive com-
patibility of experimentation as well as incentive compatibility of all non-experimenters.
Investigating how these issues can be navigated in more general settings (for example, with
a more realistic road network and richer dynamic and stochastic elements or in models
of payoff dependence resulting from other considerations) is an important area for future
work.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs of Section 3: Two stage example
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose that k ≥ 2 agents experiment. Then the cost of any of
these agents is
[expected cost of risky] = kµβ + ηR ≥ kµβ ≥ 2µβ > 2(S0 + S1N),
where we denoted by ηR the expected cost in the second round, which is for sure non-
negative and we used Assumption 2. If instead the agent switches to safe he will have an
expected cost of
[expected cost of safe] = S0 + S1(N − k + 1) + ηS ≤ S0 + S1(N − 1) + S0 + S1N,
where we denoted by ηS the expected cost in the second round, which is at most S0 +S1N
as the agent can always play safe in the second round and in the worst case every other
agent is also playing safe. Since S0 + S1(N − 1) + S0 + S1N < 2(S0 + S1N), it follows
that the cost of experimenting is greater than the overall cost of taking safe. Thus, it is
never a pure strategy equilibrium for more than one person to experiment – under any
information scheme.
Proof of Theorem 1 Recall we are considering pure strategy equilibria. Using Lemma 1
we can characterize when it is an agent’s best response to experiment under the two
different information schemes.
Full information: If no agent experiments the cost for each agent is 2(S0 + S1N). If
any agent experiments all agents learn θ before round two and there are two possibilities.
1) If θ = H, everyone takes the safe road in the second round as S0 + S1N < H.
2) If θ = L, the agents play a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and split the flow across
the two roads, i.e. xeqL take risky. The expected cost of equilibrium in the second
round when θ = L is therefore g(xeqL , L)/N = (x
eq
L /N)(Lx
eq
L ) + (N − xeqL )/N(S0 +
S1(N − xeqL )).
All agents playing safe is an equilibrium if and only if the cost of switching to experi-
menting is worse than 2(S0 + S1N). The expected cost of one agent switching is
µβ + βg(x
eq
L , L)/N + (1− β)(S0 + S1N)
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where the first term is the cost of experimenting in the first round, the second term is the
cost in the second round if θ = L weighted by P(θ = L), and similarly the last term is the
cost if θ = H weighted by P(θ = H).
Overall, if
2(S0 + S1N) < µβ + βg(x
eq
L , L)/N + (1− β)(S0 + S1N), (A.1)
no one experiments. Otherwise, one agent experimenting in the first round is the unique
pure strategy Nash equilibrium (recall by Lemma 1 that it is never incentive compatible
for more than one agent to experiment). The total cost of the first round under this
equilibrium is g(1, µβ) and if θ = H the total cost of the second round is g(0), while if
θ = L the total cost of the second round is g(xeqL , L). The thresholds βf can be obtained
by imposing equality in (A.1) and solving for β.
Private information: No experimentation is an equilibrium if and only if it is not
individually optimal for an agent to play risky. Similarly to the previous case, this occurs
when the expected cost of switching to playing risky is worse than all agents playing safe,
that is, when
2(S0 + S1N) < µβ + βL+ (1− β)(S0 + S1N), (A.2)
where we used the fact that, under private information, it is a best response for all the
agents that were on safe at time 1 to remain on safe at time 2, while for the experimenter
it is a best response to take risky at time 2 if he observed L at time 1 and safe otherwise.
If the above does not hold, then there is an incentive to deviate from all playing safe and
there exists an asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium, where one agent experiments
in the first round. By Lemma 1, this is the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The
expected cost of the first round is g(1, µβ) and the expected cost of the second round is
βg(1, L) + (1 − β)g(0). The thresholds βp can be obtained by imposing equality in (A.2)
and solving for β.
Finally, note that βp ≤ βf if and only if g(x
eq
L ,L)
N ≥ L. Note that by Assumption 2
L < S0 + S1, thus x
eq
L ≥ 1. If xeqL = N then g(xeqL , L) = LN2 and the inequality holds.
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Instead, if 1 ≤ xeqL ≤ N − 1 then
g(xeqL , L) = L(x
eq
L )
2 + (S0 + S1(N − xeqL ))(N − xeqL )
= L(xeqL )
2 + S0(N − xeqL ) + S1(N − xeqL )(N − xeqL )
≥ LxeqL + (S0 + S1)(N − xeqL )
> LxeqL + L(N − xeqL )
≥ LN
where the first inequality follows xeqL , N − xeqL ≥ 1, while the second follows from L <
S0 + S1.
Proof of Corollary 1 In this interval of beliefs:
• under full information there is no experimentation and the cost is 2g(0).
• under private information there is experimentation. The experimenter has a total
cost for the two rounds that is less than 2(S0 + S1N), otherwise he would switch to
safe. All the other agents have cost 2(S0 +S1(N − 1)) < 2(S0 +S1N). Therefore the
total cost is strictly less than 2N(S0 + S1N) = 2g(0).
Proof of Theorem 2 The social optimum is the minimum total cost for the two rounds.
If all agents use the safe road in both rounds then the total cost is 2g(0). If the CP sends
at least one agent on the risky road in the first round the CP learns θ and can make a
decision on how many agents to send on the risky road in the second round based on the
value of θ. Denote these flows by x
R|L
2 and x
R|H
2 . Thus, if the CP experiments with x
R
1 > 0
agents in the first round, he is facing the following optimization problem
min
xR1 ,x
R|L
2 ,x
R|H
2
g(xR1 , µβ) + βg(x
R|L
2 , L) + (1− β)g(xR|H2 , H)
s.t. 1 ≤ xR1 ≤ N
0 ≤ xR|L2 ≤ N
0 ≤ xR|H2 ≤ N
xR1 , x
R|L
2 , x
R|H
2 ∈ Z≥0.
This minimization can be separated into three optimization problems, one for each of the
flows xR1 , x
R|L
2 , x
R|H
2 .
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• For the first round xR1 can be obtained by solving
min
xR1
µβ(x
R
1 )
2 + (S0 + S1(N − xR1 ))(N − xR1 )
s.t. 1 ≤ xR1 ≤ N
xR1 ∈ Z≥0.
Since S0 +S1N < µβ, the cost is strictly increasing for x
R
1 ≥ 1 and thus the optimal
solution is xR1 = 1.
• For the second round, the two values xR|L2 and xR|H2 can be found separately and are
just the values that minimize g(x, L) and g(x,H) respectively, which are xSOL and
xSOH by definition.
The minimum of all agents playing safe and the objective of the above minimization
problem gives the social optimum cost and the threshold βSO is the belief under which the
CP is indifferent between experimentation and all agents playing safe. Note that βSO < βp
because if experimentation is an equilibrium under private information it implies it is
optimal for the CP to experiment. Specifically if experimentation is an equilibrium under
private information then β is such that
2(S0 + S1N) ≥ µβ + βL+ (1− β)(S0 + S1N).
This implies
2(S0 + S1N) + 2(S0 + S1N)(N − 1)
≥ µβ + (S0 + S1N)(N − 1) + β(L+ (S0 + S1N)(N − 1))
+ (1− β)((S0 + S1N)N)
≥ µβ + (S0 + S1(N − 1))(N − 1) + βg(xSOL , L) + (1− β)g(xSOH , H)
⇐⇒ 2(S0 + S1N)N ≥ µβ + (S0 + S1(N − 1))(N − 1) + βg(xSOL , L) + (1− β)g(xSOH , H)
which is the condition for experimentation to be optimal for the CP.
Proof of Theorem 3
Recall by Lemma 1 that in any equilibrium there is at most one experimenter in the
first round. Hence we can distinguish two cases:
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1. No experimentation: if no agent experiments the social cost is 2g(0);
2. One experimenter: For a recommendation scheme pi to be incentive compatible,
it must be that pi(L), pi(H) are such that an agent follows the recommendation he is
given. We study incentive compatibility starting from the second round. In this
case there are three type of agents:
• Type 1 (experimenter in round 2): The experimenter knows the value of
θ since he observed it in the first round. We next show that without loss of
optimality we can restrict our attention to recommendation schemes where it is
a best response for the experimenter to take risky in the second round if θ = L
and safe if θ = H.
– θ = H: The experimenter’s cost on safe is S0 + S1(N − pi(H)), the cost on
risky is H(pi(H) + 1). The conclusion follows since,
S0 + S1(N − pi(H)) ≤ S0 + S1N < H ≤ H(pi(H) + 1),
where we used the fact that H > S0 + S1N by assumption.
– θ = L: Let x
R|L
2 be the equilibrium flow on the risky road in the second
round (this a priori may or may not include the experimenter). For in-
centive compatibility it must be x
R|L
2 ≤ xeqL . In fact if that was not the
case, consider an agent that was on safe in the first round and receives a
recommendation of risky. This agent doesn’t know θ, but he knows that
in both cases (θ = L or θ = H) switching to safe would give a better cost.
Hence a scheme that leads to x
R|L
2 > x
eq
L is not incentive compatible. We
then distinguish two cases for the experimenter:
∗ if the experimenter belongs to the flow xR|L2 then deviating to safe is
not convenient because x
R|L
2 ≤ xeqL ;
∗ if the experimenter is on safe, then either xR|L2 < xeqL in which cases it
is convenient for the experimenter to deviate to risky or x
R|L
2 = x
eq
L .
Overall the only case when it might be convenient for the experimenter to
take safe after observing θ = L is for recommendation schemes such that
x
R|L
2 = x
eq
L . Note that the social cost of such a scheme is the same as full
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information. We are going to show at the end of this proof that the optimal
solution of (3.2) is weakly less than full information.
Overall, the previous discussion shows that we can assume x
R|L
2 = pi(L)+1 and
x
R|H
2 = pi(H) without loss of optimality. For simplicity we denote these flows
by xL and xH in the rest of this proof.
• Type 2 (recommended safe): An agent of this type took safe in the first
round and received a recommendation to take safe, signal rS , before the second
round. His expected cost of following the recommendation is
S0 + S1(P(θ = L | rS)(N − xL) + P(θ = H | rS)(N − xH)),
as the flow he will experience depends on how many agents are being sent to
risky. Deviating gives an expected cost of
P(θ = L | rS)L(xL + 1) + P(θ = H | rS)H(xH + 1).
By Bayes rule
P(θ = L | rS) = βP(rS | θ = L)
βP(rS | θ = L) + (1− β)P(rS | θ = H)
=
βN−xLN−1
βN−xLN−1 + (1− β)N−xH−1N−1
=
β(N − xL)
β(N − xL) + (1− β)(N − xH − 1)
P(θ = H | rS) = 1− P(θ = L | rS).
Thus, the full constraint is
S0 + S1
(
β(N − xL)2
β(N − xL) + (1− β)(N − xH − 1) +
(1− β)(N − xH)(N − xH − 1)
β(N − xL) + (1− β)(N − xH − 1)
)
(A.3)
≤ β(N − xL)L(xL + 1)
β(N − xL) + (1− β)(N − xH − 1) +
(1− β)(N − xH − 1)H(xH + 1)
β(N − xL) + (1− β)(N − xH − 1) .
• Type 3 (recommended risky) An agent of this type took safe in the first
round and received a recommendation to take risky, signal rR, before the second
round. His expected cost of following the recommendation is
P(θ = L | rR)LxL + P(θ = H | rR)HxH
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and deviating gives an expected cost of
S0 + S1(P(θ = L | rR)(N − xL + 1) + P(θ = H | rR)(N − xH + 1)).
By Bayes rule
P(θ = L | rR) = βP(rR | θ = L)
βP(rR | θ = L) + (1− β)P(rR | θ = H)
=
β xL−1N−1
β xL−1N−1 + (1− β) xHN−1
=
β(xL − 1)
β(xL − 1) + (1− β)xH
P(θ = H | rR) = 1− P(θ = L | rR).
Thus, the full constraint is
β(xL − 1)
β(xL − 1) + (1− β)xH LxL +
(1− β)xH
β(xL − 1) + (1− β)xHHxH (A.4)
≤ S0 + S1
(
β(xL − 1)
β(xL − 1) + (1− β)xH (N − xL + 1) (A.5)
+
(1− β)xH
β(xL − 1) + (1− β)xH (N − xH + 1)
)
The constraints above are for the second round, we next consider the first round.
We already know by Lemma 1 that it is not convenient for any agent on safe to join
the experimenter. Hence we only need to ensure that it is incentive compatible for
the experimenter to experiment in the first round. Equivalently, we need to show
that experimenting gives a weakly lower cost than all agents playing safe for two
rounds (2(S0 + S1N)), which leads to the constraint
βL+ (1− β)H + βLxL + (1− β)(S0 + S1(N − xH)) ≤ 2(S0 + S1N). (A.6)
The CP then solves the constrained optimization problem given in (3.2), where the
objective function is the total travel time summed over the two periods and the IC
constraints (3.2b), (3.2c) and (3.2d) can be explicitly rewritten as detailed in (A.3),
(A.4), and (A.6) respectively.
Finally it is easy to show that the choices pi2(L) = pi2(H) = 0 and, for β ≥ βf ,
pi2(L) = x
eq
L − 1, pi2(H) = 0 are feasible (i.e. satisfy (A.3), (A.4), and (A.6)) and
lead to the same social cost as private and full information respectively, thus proving
that partial information is weakly better than private and full information.
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B Proofs of Section 4: Infinite horizon
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We start by showing that under the given assumptions xSOH = 0 and x
SO
L ≥ 2.
• xSOH = 0 : Note that
Eθt [g(x, θt) | βt−1 = 0] = µHx2 + S0(N − x) = g(x, µH).
We next show that under the given assumptions g(0, µH) ≤ g(1, µH). Together with
the fact that g(x, µH) is strongly convex in x, this proves the desired statement.
Note that
g(0, µH) ≤ g(1, µH)⇔ S0N ≤ µH + S0(N − 1)⇔ S0 ≤ µH ,
and the latter inequality holds by Assumption 3.
• xSOL ≥ 2 : xSOL is the minimizer of g(x, µL), which is strongly convex in x. For the
minimizer to be ≥ 2, the cost at x = 2 must be strictly less than at x = 1, that is,
g(2, µL) = 4µL + S0(N − 2) < µL + S0(N − 1) = g(1, µL)
rearranging gives
µL <
1
3
S0,
which holds by Assumption 3.
Since the CP has full control, (4.2) is an optimal control problem and we can apply
the one-step deviation principle to prove optimality. To this end, we distinguish two cases
• Consider any β such that xSOβ ≥ 1:
Sending a number of agents different from xSOβ doesn’t lead to a profitable deviation.
In fact, the stage cost would be higher (since xSOβ is the minimizer of g(x, µβ)) and
the continuation cost would be the same (as no more information can be gained by
sending more agents to the risky road).
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• Consider any β such that xSOβ = 0:
In this case sending piSO(β) = 1 agent is not myopically optimal and the stage cost
could be reduced by sending no agent. Nonetheless, we show that because sending
one agent provides information about the state of the risky road, piSO(β) = 1 is the
best strategy if the CP is forward looking. There are two possible deviations:
1. The CP sends more than one agent: similarly to the previous case the stage
cost increases and the continuation cost stays the same. Hence this deviation
is not profitable.
2. The CP does not send any agents: to analyze this case, let β′ be the belief that
θt+1 = L when an agent has belief β that θt = L (i.e. β
′ = β(1−γL)+(1−β)γH).
We start by noting that xSOβ = 0 ⇒ xSOβ′ ≤ 1 ⇒ piSO(β′) = 1 (see Lemma 4
below). The cost that the CP encounters by sending one agent at time t is
V (β) =µβ + S0(N − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
stage cost time t
+ δ
(
β′(µL(xSOL )
2 + S0(N − xSOL )) + (1− β′)(µH + S0(N − 1))
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
stage cost time t+1
+δ2 . . .
while if he deviates and sends no agent at time t the cost is
V˜ (β) = S0N︸︷︷︸
stage cost time t
+δ (µβ′pi
SO(β′)2 + S0(N − piSO(β′)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
stage cost time t+1
+δ2 . . .
= S0N︸︷︷︸
stage cost time t
+δ
(
β′(µL + S0(N − 1)) + (1− β′)(µH + S0(N − 1))
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
stage cost time t+1
+δ2 . . .
where we used µβ′ = β
′µL + (1−β′)µH and piSO(β′) = 1. Note that we did not
report the stage costs from time t+ 2 on as they are equal under both schemes.
Overall, piSO(β) = 1 is optimal if V (β) ≤ V˜ (β) or equivalently,
µβ + S0(N − 1) + δβ′(µL(xSOL )2 + S0(N − xSOL )) ≤ S0N + δβ′(µL + S0(N − 1))
⇔ µβ ≤ S0 + δβ′[g(1, µL)− g(xSOL , µL)]. (B.1)
Note that g(1, µL) − g(xSOL , µL) ≥ 0 since xSOL = arg minx g(c, µL). Moreover
when β increases µβ decreases. Hence it suffices to prove that (B.1) holds for
the smallest possible value of β which is 0.
37
We note that g(1, µL)− g(xSOL , µL) ≥ S0 − 3µL since
g(1, µL)− g(xSOL , µL) ≥ g(1, µL)− g(2, µL)
= µL + S0(N − 1)− 4µL − S0(N − 2) = S0 − 3µL.
Note that S0 − 3µL ≥ S03 − µL ≥ 0 by Assumption 3 and thus a sufficient
condition for (B.1) to hold when β = 0 (and β′ = γH) is
µH ≤ S0 + δγH
[
S0
3
− µL
]
,
which holds by Assumption 3.
Lemma 4 xSOβ = 0⇒ xSOβ′ ≤ 1.
Proof A sufficient condition for xSOβ′ ≤ 1 is
g(1, µβ′) = µβ′ + S0(N − 1) < 4µβ′ + S0(N − 2) = g(2, µβ′)⇔ µβ′ > S0
3
.
We next show that µβ′ >
µβ
3 . The conclusion then follows since x
SO
β = 0 implies
g(0, µβ) = S0N < µβ + S0(N − 1) = g(1, µβ)⇔ µβ > S0.
To show 3µβ′ > µβ recall that µβ′ = βµL + (1 − β)µH ≥ βL + (1 − β)µH and µH =
(1− γH)H + γHL ≥ 12H. Hence
3µβ′ ≥ 3βL+ 3(1− β)µH ≥ 3
2
βL+
3
2
βL+
3
2
(1− β)H ≥ 3
2
µβ > µβ.
B.2 Preliminary statements in support of the proof of Proposition 2
To prove our main Proposition 2 we start with some additional statements. We first prove
that the agent’s state can be simplified as detailed in Lemma 2 in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 2: If all agents are following the scheme pic,d then the flow on the risky
road at time t−1 is distinct depending on whether θt−2 = H or θt−2 = L. Thus, either an
agent was on the risky road at time t− 1 and observed θt−1 or the agent was on safe and
can infer xt−1 and (from that) θt−2. By the Markov property of θ and the stationarity of
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the recommendation policy no information before θt−2 is useful to the agents. Thus, the
state zit is a sufficient summary for any agent to determine his expected ongoing cost, as
well as the information that other agents have. If agents do not follow the scheme, then
all agents receive full information and this state is still sufficient as every agent and the
CP will have symmetric information. 
From here on we consider the values of c, d fixed (satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 2)
and we denote by u∗(zit) the expected cost under pic,d of an agent whose state is zit. We
note that the expected cost for any agent that knows that the risky road was high at the
previous step (θt−1 = H) and before receiving a recommendation for time t is the same, no
matter his state. Intuitively, this is true because according to the recommendation scheme
pic,d if θt−1 = H then at the next step the CP sends the recommendation rR to one and
only one agent (the experimenter) selected at random among all the agents independent
of previous actions or knowledge.
Lemma 5 The expected cost
v¯ := Epic,d [u
∗([xt−1, θit−1, r
i
t−1]) | xt−1 = x, θit−1 = H]
is the same for all x ≥ 1.
Proof Whenever θt−1 = H is observed, a new experimenter is chosen among all agents.
Thus every agent, no matter which road he was on, has an identical likelihood of being
chosen as the experimenter at time t. Note that v¯ conditions on the knowledge that
θt−1 = H, hence there is no need for distinguishing states where agents do not know the
state of the road. In other words, the expectation is only over the recommendation scheme
pic,d and thus
v¯ =
1
N
u∗([xt−1, H, rR])︸ ︷︷ ︸
ongoing cost as the experimenter
+
N − 1
N
u∗([xt−1, H, rS ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
ongoing cost on safe
=
1
N
u∗([1, H, rR]) +
N − 1
N
u∗([1, H, rS ]).
In the second line we substitute the observed flow with 1 since it is unimportant (i.e. these
costs are the same for any xt−1 ≥ 1); given the state θt−1 = H, the flow in the previous
round will not effect the ongoing cost: as at time t one agent will be on risky and N − 1
will be on safe.
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Table 2: Expected stage costs if agents follow the recommendation scheme given in Propo-
sition 2
State of the risky road H H . . . L L L . . . H
Number of agents on risky - 1 . . . 1 c d . . . d
Expected stage cost on risky - µH . . . µH µLc µLd . . . µLd
Expected stage cost on safe - S0 . . . S0 S0 S0 . . . S0
Lemma 5 simplifies our analysis because it implies that we can partition the infinite
horizon into consecutive periods by defining the beginning of a new period as the time
immediately after the risky road switches from L to H, see Table 1 in the main text.
Conditioned on the agents knowing that a new period has begun, their ongoing cost
from that point on is the same (i.e. v¯) independent of their history. This observation
simplifies the analysis of incentive compatibility and optimality. Table 1 in the main text
illustrates the flow in the risky road under the social optimum and the scheme described
in Proposition 2 within one period. Table 2 illustrates the expected stage cost for agents
taking the risky road or the safe road under the scheme described in Proposition 2.
We start our analysis by deriving closed form expressions and relations for the cost
u∗(z) of different states z reached under pic,d.
Lemma 6 (Closed form expression of auxiliary cost)
1. u∗([c, L, rR]) = u∗([d, L, rR]) = 11−δ(1−γL) (µLd+ δγLv¯)
2. u∗([c, L, rS ]) = u∗([d, L, rS ]) = 11−δ(1−γL)(S0 + δγLv¯)
Proof
1. The first equality follows from the fact that the flow on the risky road after θ = L
and the flow c or d is d. The second equality follows from u∗([d, L, rR]) = µLd +
δ((1− γL)u∗([d, L, rR]) + γLv¯) (see (B.4)).
2. The first equality follows similarly to the above point and the second follows from
u∗([d, L, rS ]) = S0 + δ((1− γL)u∗([d, L, rS ]) + γLv¯) (see (B.4)).
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Lemma 7 µLc ≤ µLd ≤ S0 and c ≥ S02µL − 12 .
Proof The first chain of inequalities follows immediately from the assumption c ≤ d ≤ xeqL
and µLx
eq
L ≤ S0 by the equilibrium condition. Finally, since xSOL is either the closest integer
that to S02µL , one gets c ≥ xSOL ≥
S0
2µL
− 12 .
Remark 2 According to Definition 3, if any agent deviates the punishment is full infor-
mation. Specifically, we assume that the CP sends a recommendation of risky to each
agent with probability S0Nµβ , so that the expected cost on risky is exactly equal to the fixed
cost S0 of the safe road. The continuation cost after any deviation is therefore
u∗dev = S0 + δS0 + δ
2S0 + . . . =
1
1− δS0,
Independent of the belief β.
Lemma 8 The following statements hold:
1. v¯ < 11−δS0
2. u∗([d, L, rR]) ≤ 11−δS0
3. u∗(1, L) :=
(
c−1
N−1u
∗([1, L, rR]) + N−cN−1u
∗([1, L, rS ])
)
≤ u∗([d, L, rS ]) ≤ 11−δS0
4. u∗(c, L) :=
(
d−c
N−cu
∗([c, L, rR]) + N−dN−cu
∗([c, L, rS ])
)
≤ u∗([d, L, rS ]) ≤ 11−δS0
Proof
1.
v¯ =
1
N
µH +
N − 1
N
S0 + δ
(
γH
(
c
N
µLc+
N − c
N
S0
+δ
(
γLv¯ + (1− γL)
(
d
N
u∗([d, L, rR]) +
N − d
N
u∗([d, L, rS ])
)))
+ (1− γH)v¯
)
where u∗([d, L, rR]) and u∗([d, L, rS ]) are as defined in Lemma 6. To simplify expo-
sition recall that
g(1, µH) := µH + (N − 1)S0
g(c, µL) := µLc
2 + (N − c)S0
g(d, µL) := µLd
2 + (N − d)S0
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then v¯ can be written as
v¯ =
1− δ(1− γL)
N(1− δ)(1− δ(1− γH − γL))
(
g(1, µH) + δγH
(
g(c, µL) +
δ(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)g(d, µL)
))
(B.2)
To show the inequality holds we first multiply both sides by (1− δ)N
1− δ(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL − γH)
(
g(1, µH) + δγH
(
g(c, µL) +
δ(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)g(d, µL)
))
< S0N
⇐⇒ (1− δ(1− γL))(g(1, µH) + δγHg(c, µL)) + δ2γH(1− γL)g(d, µL)
< (1− δ(1− γL − γH))S0N
⇐⇒ (1− δ(1− γL))(µH + S0(N − 1) + δγHg(c, µL)) + δ2γH(1− γL)g(d, µL)
< (1− δ(1− γL))S0N + δγHS0N − δ2γH(1− γL)S0N + δ2γH(1− γL)S0N
⇐⇒ (1− δ(1− γL))(µH + δγHg(c, µL)) + δ2γH(1− γL)g(d, µL)
< (1− δ(1− γL))(S0 + δγHS0N) + δ2γH(1− γL)S0N.
By Lemma 7, g(d, µL) ≤ S0N , so it is sufficient to show
µH + δγHg(c, µL) < S0 + δγHS0N ⇐⇒ µH < S0 + δγH(S0N − g(c, µL)).
Note that, by assumption, g(c, µL) ≤ g(2, µL) < g(1, µL) hence
S0N − g(c, µL) > S0N − (S0(N − 1) + µL) = S0 − µL > S0
3
− µL.
Thus, it is sufficient if
µH ≤ S0 + δγH
(
S0
3
− µL
)
which holds by Assumption 3.
2. The cost u∗([d, L, rR]) is defined in Lemma 6. Then
u∗([d, L, rR]) =
1
1− δ(1− γL)(µLd+ δγLv¯) ≤
1
1− δS0
⇐⇒ (1− δ)(µLd+ δγLv¯) ≤ (1− δ(1− γL))S0
⇐⇒ (1− δ)µLd+ (1− δ)δγLv¯ ≤ (1− δ)S0 + δγLS0
and the result holds by part 1 of this lemma and by Lemma 7.
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3. Expanding the cost u∗(1, L)
u∗(1, L) =
c− 1
N − 1µLc+
N − c
N − 1S0
+ δ
(
(1− γL)
(
d− 1
N − 1u
∗([d, L, rR]) +
N − d
N − 1u
∗([d, L, rS ])
)
+ γLv¯
)
.
Note that u∗([d, L, rS ]) = S0 + δ(1 − γL)u∗([d, L, rS ]) + δγLv¯. Then u∗(1, L) ≤
u∗([d, L, rS ]) holds if
c− 1
N − 1µLc+
N − c
N − 1S0 +
δ(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)
(
d− 1
N − 1µLd+
N − d
N − 1S0
)
≤ S0 + δ(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)S0
which is true by Lemma 7.
For the second inequality, we need
1
1− δ(1− γL)(S0 + δγLv¯) ≤
1
1− δS0 (B.3)
⇐⇒ (1− δ)(S0 + δγLv¯) ≤ (1− δ + δγL)S0
and the result follows from the first point of the lemma.
4. By using Lemma 6, we can expand u∗(c, L) as
u∗(c, L) =
d− c
N − c
(
1
1− δ(1− γL) (µLd+ δγLv¯)
)
+
N − d
N − c
(
1
1− δ(1− γL) (S0 + δγLv¯)
)
=
1
1− δ(1− γL)
(
d− c
N − cµLd+
N − d
N − cS0 + δγLv¯
)
,
It follows by Lemma 7, that
u∗(c, L) ≤ 1
1− δ(1− γL)(S0 + δγLv¯) = u
∗([d, L, rS ])
and the result follows from part 3 of this lemma.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
As in the two stage case, we break the agents into types based on individual’s infor-
mation. We detail the possible states agents reach under pic,d and show that ξpic,d is an
equilibrium by showing that at each state any deviation would lead to a higher expected
cost. Each equilibrium constraint in this setting is dynamic (i.e. consists of both stage
and continuation cost).
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Type 1 (βit−1 = L, rit−1 = rR)
Agents of this type took the risky road at time t − 1 and observed L. Under pic,d these
agents receive a recommendation to remain on risky, so rit−1 = rR for all cases below. We
further distinguish different states based on the observed flow on risky at time t− 1. We
present our results in decreasing order of number of other agents that took risky at t− 1.
We show that in each case an agent that observes L follows the recommendation and stays
on risky.
• [xt−1,βit−1, rit−1] = [d,L, rR]: this agent is part of what we call the “incentive com-
patible” flow, which is the flow d. If everybody follows the recommendation then
xt = d. Agent i’s expected costs under pic,d (if he follows or if he deviates) are
therefore
- Following:
u∗([d, L, rR]) = µLd︸︷︷︸
stage cost
for t
+δ
(
(1− γL)u∗([d, L, rR])︸ ︷︷ ︸
ongoing cost
if θt = L
+γL Epic,d [u
∗([d,H, ri])]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ongoing cost if θt = H
)
,
= µLd+ δ ((1− γL) u∗([d, L, rR]) + γLv¯) , (B.4)
- Deviating to safe:
S0︸︷︷︸
stage cost for t
+ δu∗dev︸ ︷︷ ︸
ongoing cost
= S0 +
δ
1− δS0 (B.5)
Thus, taking the risky road is an equilibrium if
µLd+ δ ((1− γL) u∗([d, L, rR]) + γLv¯) ≤ S0 + δ
1− δS0. (B.6)
The inequality holds by Lemmas 7, 8-1, and 8-2.
• [xt−1,βit−1, rit−1] = [c,L, rR] this agent is part of the “exploiters” (agents that are
sent to the risky road the first period after the experimenter saw L). If everybody
follows the recommendation the flow on risky will be xt = d.
By Lemma 6, the costs are the same as in state [d, L, rR] (as given in (B.4) and
(B.5)). The equilibrium constraint is therefore identical to (B.6) and is satisfied.
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• [xt−1,βit−1, rit−1] = [1,L, rR] this agent is the current experimenter and just saw
the road change to “low”. If everybody follows the recommendation the next flow
on risky would be xt = c. His expected costs are
- Following:
u∗([1, L, rR]) = µLc+ δ((1− γL)u∗([c, L, rR]) + γLv¯). (B.7)
- Deviating to safe:
S0 + δu
∗
dev = S0 +
δ
1− δS0
The agent follows the recommendation if
µLc+ δ((1− γL)u∗([c, L, rR]) + γLv¯) ≤ S0 + δ
1− δS0.
This inequality holds by Lemmas 6, 7, 8-1, and 8-2.
Type 2 (βit−1 = H)
These agents took risky and saw H, this means a new experimenter will be chosen. They
each will receive a recommendation of either rR or rS . Since the state is H the flow on
risky in the next round is xt = 1 no matter the previous flow and we can divide the states
by recommendations
• rit−1 = rS . He is not the experimenter.
- Following the recommendation and taking safe
u∗([−, H, rS ]) = S0 + δ(γHu∗(1, L) + (1− γH)v¯) (B.8)
- Deviating
2µH +
δ
1− δS0
Thus, the incentive constraint holds by Lemma 8-1, 8-3, and Assumption 3.
• rit−1 = rR. This agent has been selected to be the experimenter. Recall that if the
agent deviates then full information is provided from then on and the cost is S0 at
every round (see Remark 2). The agent’s expected costs are
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- Following the recommendation and taking risky
u∗([xt−1, H, rR]) = µH + δ(γHu∗([1, L, rR]) + (1− γH)v¯) (B.9)
- Deviating
S0 +
δ
1− δS0
The incentive constraint can be written
µH + δ(γHu
∗([1, L, rR]) + (1− γH)v¯) ≤ S0 + γH δ
1− δS0 + (1− γH)
δ
1− δS0
and by Lemma 8-1 it suffices to show
µH + δγHu
∗([1, L, rR]) ≤ S0 + γH δ
1− δS0.
Note that
u∗([1, L, rR]) = µLc+ δ((1− γL)u∗([c, L, rR]) + γLv¯) ≤ µLc+ δ
1− δS0
where the upper bound follows from Lemma 6-1, 8-1 and 8-2. Thus, it is sufficient if
µH ≤ S0 + δγH(S0 − µLc)
≤ S0 + δγH
(
S0 − µL
(
S0
2µL
− 1
2
))
= S0 + δγH
1
2
(S0 + µL)
where the second inequality follows by Lemma 7. The result holds by Assumption 3.
Type 3 (βit−1 = U, rit−1 = rS)
These agents took safe at time t − 1 and received a recommendation to remain on safe,
rS . Note that since these agents took safe at time t− 1 they do not know θt−1. Receiving
a recommendation of safe either means that θt−1 = L (and the agent continues to be part
of the flow on the safe road) or that θt−1 = H (a new cycle has begun but the agent is
not the new experimenter). For simplicity we denote the probability of the first event by
px,S = P(θt−1 = L | xt−1 = x, rit−1 = rS). Note that this probability depends on the flow
x observed at t− 1. The following lemma relates these probabilities for the cases xt−1 = d
and xt−1 = c.
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Lemma 9 The following statements hold
1. pd,S =
1−γL
1−γL+γL N−1N
2. pc,S =
(1−γL)N−dN−c
(1−γL)N−dN−c+γL N−1N
3. p1,S =
γH
N−c
N−1
(1−γH)N−1N +γH N−cN−1
4. pc,S ≤ pd,S
Proof
1. Note that the agent can infer θt−2 = L from the flow being d on the risky road at
time t− 1. Therefore, by Bayes rule
pd,S := P(θt−1 = L | [d, U, rS ]) (B.10)
=
(1− γL)P(rS | θt−1 = L, xt−1 = d)
(1− γL)P(rS | θt−1 = L, xt−1 = d) + γLP(rS | θt−1 = H,xt−1 = d)
=
1− γL
1− γL + γLN−1N
. (B.11)
2. Note that the agent can infer θt−2 = L from the flow being c on the risky road at
time t− 1. By Bayes rule
pc,S := P(θt−1 = L | [c, U, rS ]) (B.12)
=
(1− γL)P(rS | θt−1 = L, xt−1 = c)
(1− γL)P(rS | θt−1 = L, xt−1 = c) + γLP(rS | θt−1 = H,xt−1 = c)
=
(1− γL)N−dN−c
(1− γL)N−dN−c + γLN−1N
.
3. Note that the agent can infer θt−2 = H from the flow being 1 on the risky road at
time t− 1. By Bayes rule
p1,S := P(θt−1 = L | [1, U, rS ])
=
γHP(rS | θt−1 = L, xt−1 = 1)
(1− γH)P(rS | θt−1 = H,xt−1 = 1) + γHP(rS | θt−1 = L, xt−1 = 1)
=
γH
N−c
N−1
γH
N−c
N−1 + (1− γH)N−1N
.
4. For positive α, β, η
α
α+ β
≥ η
η + β
⇐⇒ α ≥ η.
47
Let α := 1 − γL, β := γLN−1N , and η := (1 − γL)N−dN−c . Then pd,S = αα+β and
pc,S =
η
η+β . The fact that d ≥ c implies α ≥ η and therefore pd,S ≥ pc,S .
The possible states for agents of Type 2 are
• [xt−1,βit−1, rit−1] = [d,U, rS]: these agents were on safe at time t−1, observed flow
d and received a recommendation to remain on safe. Their expected costs are
- Following the recommendation and taking safe
u∗([d, U, rS ]) = pd,S u∗([d, L, rS ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost if θt−1=L
+(1− pd,S)u∗([−, H, rS ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost if θt−1=H
.
- Deviating to risky
pd,SµL(d+ 1) + (1− pd,S)2µH + δ
1− δS0
This inequality holds by assumption (4.4).
• [xt−1,βit−1, rit−1] = [c,U, rS]: The agent’s expected costs are
- Following the recommendation and taking safe
u∗([c, U, rS ]) = pc,S u∗([d, L, rS ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
F1
+(1− pc,S)u∗([−, H, rS ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
F2
.
- Deviating
pc,S
(
µL(d+ 1) +
δ
1− δS0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
D1
+(1− pc,S)
(
2µH +
δ
1− δS0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
D2
By inspection, this case is similar to the previous case ([d, U, rS ]). The only difference
is the beliefs (pd,S for the previous case, and pc,S for this case). The incentive
compatibility constraint (4.4) for the previous case can be written compactly as
pd,SF1 + (1− pd,S)F2 ≤ pd,SD1 + (1− pd,S)D2
or equivalently
pd,S(F1 −D1) + (1− pd,S)(F2 −D2) ≤ 0.
48
We next show that (F2 − D2) ≤ (F1 − D1). Since, by Lemma 9 pc,S ≤ pd,S , by
properties of convex combinations, this suffices to show that
pc,S(F1 −D1) + (1− pc,S)(F2 −D2) ≤ pd,S(F1 −D1) + (1− pd,S)(F2 −D2) ≤ 0,
as desired. To show (F2 − D2) ≤ (F1 − D1) we equivalently show (F2 + D1) ≤
(F1 +D2). Note
F2 = u
∗([−, H, rS ]) = S0 + δ (γHu∗(1, L) + (1− γH)v¯)
F1 = u
∗([d, L, rS ]) = S0 + δ((1− γL)u∗([d, L, rS ]) + γLv¯).
Hence (F2 +D1) ≤ (F1 +D2) can be rewritten as
S0 + δ((1− γH)v¯ + γHu∗(1, L)) + µL(d+ 1) + δ
1− δS0
≤ S0 + δ(γLv¯ + (1− γL)u∗([d, L, rS ])) + 2µH + δ
1− δS0
⇐⇒ δ(1− γL − γH)v¯ + µL(d+ 1) ≤ δ((1− γL)u∗([d, L, rS ])− γHu∗(1, L)) + 2µH .
By Lemma 7 and by Assumption 3, µLd + µL ≤ S0 + S0 ≤ 2µH and it is sufficient
to show
(1− γL − γH)v¯ ≤ (1− γL)u∗([d, L, rS ])− γHu∗(1, L).
The right hand side can be lower bounded using Lemma 8-3 by
(1− γL − γH)u∗([d, L, rS ])
and incentive compatibility holds if
v¯ ≤ u∗([d, L, rS ])
⇐⇒ v¯ ≤ 1
1− δ(1− γL)(S0 + δγLv¯)
⇐⇒ (1− δ)v¯ ≤ S0
which holds by Lemma 8-1.
• [xt−1,βit−1, rit−1] = [1,U, rS] These agents were on safe at time t− 1 and observed
xt−1 = 1, thus they infer that θt−2 = H. The agent’s expected costs are
- Following the recommendation of safe
u∗([1, U, rS ]) = p1,Su∗([1, L, rS ]) + (1− p1,S)u∗([−, H, rS ]).
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- Deviating
p1,S (µL(c+ 1)) + (1− p1,S)2µH + δ
1− δS0.
The incentive compatibility constraint can thus be written as
p1,S (S0 + δ((1− γL)u∗(c, L) + γLv¯)) + (1− p1,S)(S0 + δ(γHu∗(1, L) + (1− γH)v¯))
≤ p1,S (µL(c+ 1)) + (1− p1,S) (2µH) + δ
1− δS0.
where u∗(c, L) and u∗(1, L) are as defined in Lemma 8. It follows from Lemma 8-1,
8-3, and 8-4 that
δ (p1,S((1− γL)u∗(c, L) + γLv¯) + (1− p1,S)(γHu∗(1, L) + (1− γH)v¯)) ≤ δ
1− δS0.
The result is then proven by the following lemma.
Lemma 10 S0 ≤ p1,S(µL(c+ 1)) + (1− p1,S)(2µH).
Proof Plugging in the expression of p1,S derived in Lemma 9 and rearranging(
(1− γH)N − 1
N
+ γH
N − c
N − 1
)
S0 ≤ γH N − c
N − 1(µL(c+ 1)) + (1− γH)
N − 1
N
2µH .
Since c+ 1 ≥ S02µL (by Lemma 7) the inequality above holds if(
(1− γH)N − 1
N
+ γH
N − c
N − 1
)
S0 ≤ γH N − c
N − 1
S0
2
+ (1− γH)N − 1
N
2µH
⇐⇒
(
(1− γH)N − 1
N
)
S0 + γH
N − c
N − 1
S0
2
≤ (1− γH)N − 1
N
2µH .
By Assumption 3 S0 ≤ µH , so the result holds if
γH
N − c
N − 1
1
2
≤ (1− γH)N − 1
N
.
The last inequality holds since, for all N ≥ 2,
γH
N − c
N − 1
1
2
<
γH
2
≤ (1− γH)
2
≤ (1− γH)N − 1
N
,
where we used c > 1 and γH ≤ (1− γH) (since γH ≤ 12).
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Type 4 (βit = U, r
i
t = rR)
These agents took safe at time t− 1 and received a recommendation to take risky, rR. We
show that each of these cases is comparable to one that has already been detailed. Thus,
following the recommendation is optimal. The possible states of an agent of type 4 are:
• [xt−1,βit−1, rit−1] = [d,U, rR]: receiving a recommendation of risky means the agent
is an experimenter. This is equivalent to the case [−, H, rR] as this agent can infer
that θt−1 = H since, under pic,d, the CP does not send a rR if the flow is d and
θ = L. Specifically, by Bayes rule
P(θt−1 = L | [d, U, rR])
=
(1− γL)P(rR | θt−1 = L, xt−1 = d)
(1− γL)P(rR | θt−1 = L, xt−1 = d) + γLP(rR | θt−1 = H,xt−1 = d) = 0.
Since it is a best response to take risky when the state is [−, H, rR], it is also a best
response to take risky when the state is [d, U, rR].
• [xt−1,βit−1, rit−1] = [c,U, rR]: receiving a recommendation of risky could mean an
agent is part of d (if θt−1 = L) or is the new experimenter (if θt−1 = H). Denote by
pc,R agent’s i belief that θt−1 = L. His expected cost of following the recommendation
is therefore
u∗([c, U, rR]) = pc,Ru∗([d, L, rR]) + (1− pc,R)u∗([1, H, rR]).
The cost of deviating is the convex combination of deviating under the two possible
states to safe. In both of these cases the best response is to take risky (see the states
[d, L, rR] and [1, H, rR] discussed earlier). Thus, it is a best response for the agent
in this state to take risky.
• [xt−1,βit−1, rit−1] = [1,U, rR]: receiving a recommendation of risky means that the
agent is either a part of the exploiter flow c (if θt−1 = L) or has been selected to be
the next experimenter (if θt−1 = H). Denote by p1,R agent’s i belief that θt−1 = L.
His expected cost of following the recommendation and taking risky can then be
written as
u∗([1, U, rR]) = p1,Ru∗([1, L, rR]) + (1− p1,R)u∗([1, H, rR]).
51
Similarly, the cost of deviating is a convex combination of deviating to safe from
state [1, L, rR] and deviating to safe from state [1, H, rR]. In both of these cases the
best response is to take risky. Thus, it is a best response for the agent in this state
to take risky.
Type 5 (off the equilibrium path)
Off the equilibrium path the CP provides full information, that is, sends recommendations
of risky to each agent with probability S0µβN . Note that in the full information regime every
agent has the same belief β on the state of the risky road (equal to the belief of the CP).
Moreover the continuation cost for every agent is the same, no matter his action. Since
following the received recommendation is myopically optimal no agent has an incentive to
deviate. At each point every agent’s total expected cost is 1/(1− δ)S0.
B.4 Proof of Corollary 2
The corollary follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 11 Let x¯LL be the smallest integer d that satisfies (4.4) when c = x
SO
L , then
x¯LL ≤ xeqL . (B.13)
Proof Note that
u∗([d, U, rS ]) = pd,S
S0 + δγLv¯
1− δ(1− γL) + (1− pd,S) (S0 + δ (γHu
∗(1, L) + (1− γH)v¯))
= pd,S
(
S0 +
δ(S0(1− γL) + γLv¯)
1− δ(1− γL)
)
+ (1− pd,S) (S0 + δ (γHu∗(1, L) + (1− γH)v¯)) .
Hence by Lemma 8
u∗([d, U, rS ]) ≤ pd,S
(
S0 +
δS0
1− δ
)
+ (1− pd,S)
(
S0 +
δS0
1− δ
)
= S0 +
δS0
1− δ .
A sufficient condition for (4.4) to hold is therefore,
S0 < pd,SµL(d+ 1) + (1− pd,S)2µH .
We next show that d = xeqL satisfies this condition and thus (4.4). To this end, recall that
µL(x
eq
L + 1) > S0 and µH ≥ S0 hence
pd,SµL(d+ 1) + (1− pd,S)2µH > pd,SS0 + (1− pd,S)S0 = S0,
as desired.
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B.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The proposition follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 12 As δ → 1, xLL → xSOL .
Proof Recall xLL is the smallest integer d (weakly greater than x
SO
L ) that satisfies (4.4)
for c = xSOL . Specifically, plugging in values from Lemma 6, taking the safe road (i.e.
following the recommendation) is the best response if
u∗([d, U, rS ]) = pd,S
S0 + δγLv¯
1− δ(1− γL) + (1− pd,S) (S0 + δ (γHu
∗(1, L) + (1− γH)v¯))
≤ pd,SµL(d+ 1) + (1− pd,S)2µH + δ
1− δS0. (B.14)
We let c = d = xSOL in (B.14) and show as δ → 1 the constraint holds. By Lemma 8.3 and
Lemma 6 it holds
u∗(1, L) =
xSOL − 1
N − 1
(
1
1− δ(1− γL)(µLx
SO
L + δγLv¯)
)
+
N − xSOL
N − 1
(
1
1− δ(1− γL)(S0 + δγLv¯)
)
=
1
1− δ(1− γL)
(
xSOL − 1
N − 1 µLx
SO
L +
N − xSOL
N − 1 S0
)
+ v¯
(
δγL
1− δ(1− γL)
)
.
Hence (B.14) becomes
pd,S
(
1
1− δ(1− γL)S0
)
+ (1− pd,S)
(
S0 +
δγH
1− δ(1− γL)
(
xSOL − 1
N − 1 µLx
SO
L +
N − xSOL
N − 1 S0
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+ v¯
(
pd,S
δγL
1− δ(1− γL) + (1− pd,S)
(
δ2γHγL
1− δ(1− γL) + δ(1− γH)
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
≤ pd,S
(
µL(x
SO
L + 1)
)
+ (1− pd,S) (2µH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
+
δ
1− δS0︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4
.
(B.15)
It follows from (B.2) with g(c, µL) = g(d, µL) = g(x
SO
L , µL) that
v¯ =
1
(1− δ)
1− δ(1− γL)
N(1− δ(1− γH − γL)
(
µH + (N − 1)S0 + δγH
1− δ(1− γL)
(
µL(x
SO
L )
2 + (N − xSOL )S0
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T5
.
Substituting in (B.15) and multiplying both sides by (1− δ) yields
T1(1− δ) + T5T2 ≤ T3(1− δ) + δS0.
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Since T1 and T3 are finite and limδ→1 T2 = 1, when δ → 1 a sufficient condition for (B.15)
to hold is
lim
δ→1
T5 :=
γL
(γH + γL)N
(
µH + (N − 1)S0 + γH
γL
(
µL(x
SO
L )
2 + (N − xSOL )S0
))
< S0
⇐⇒ γLµH + γLS0(N − 1) + γH(µL(xSOL )2 + S0(N − xSOL )) < (γH + γL)S0N
⇐⇒ µH < S0 + γH
γL
(−µL(xSOL )2 + S0xSOL )
= S0 +
γH
γL
xSOL (S0 − µLxSOL ).
The inequality holds by Assumption 3 if
γH
γL
xSOL (S0 − µLxSOL ) > γH
(
S0
3
− µL
)
this follows from 1/γL > 1 and
xSOL (S0 − µLxSOL ) ≥ xSOL
(
S0 − S0
2
− µL
2
)
=
xSOL
2
(S0 − µL) ≥ S0 − µL ≥ S0
3
− µL
where the first inequality follows from xSOL ≤ S02µL + 12 (can be proven similarly as in
Lemma 6) and the second inequality follows from xSOL ≥ 2.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 4
We have pi∗ = pi1,1,xSOL ,xLL and V
∗ = V1,1,xSOL ,xLL . We denote an arbitrary optimal incentive
compatible scheme (OICS) in Πˆ as p¯i := pia¯,b¯,c¯,d¯ with social cost V¯ . We proceed in steps.
1. Proof of Lemma 3: Any OICS p¯i must satisfy a¯, b¯ ≤ 1
For any recommendation in Πˆ the experimenters, i.e. the agents chosen to take risky
at time t when θt−1 = H are selected at random from all agents. Thus, with positive
probability the agent or agents chosen as part of a or b know that θt−1 = H. We
next show that if a or b is greater than one, then it is not incentive compatible for
an agent to follow this recommendation when δ ≤ 1/2. Specifically, following gives
cost of at least
2µH + δ((1− γH)vˆL + γH vˆH)
where vˆL and vˆH are some positive continuation costs. Deviating to safe has cost
1
1− δS0 ≤ 2S0 for δ ≤ 1/2.
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Since µH ≥ S0 and the continuation costs vˆL and vˆH are positive it is not incentive
compatible for the agent to follow and take risky when a, b ≥ 2. Thus, for incentive
compatibility to hold at most one agent can be sent to risky.
2. Any OICS satisfies c¯ = xSOL or c¯ = x
SO
L + 1. In this proof we assume xLL > x
SO
L
(if not pi∗ coincides with the social optimum and is thus already an OICS) hence xLL
is the minimum integer satisfying (B.14) for c = xSOL . The incentive compatibility
constraint (B.14) can be equivalently rewritten as
pd,Su
∗([d, L, rS ]) + (1− pd,S)
(
S0 + δ
(
(1− γH)v¯ + γH
(
c− 1
N − 1µLc+
N − c
N − 1S0
+δ
(
γLv¯ + (1− γL)
(
d− 1
N − 1u
∗([d, L, rR]) +
N − d
N − 1u
∗([d, L, rS ])
)))))
≤ pd,SµL(d+ 1) + (1− pd,S)2µH + δ
1− δS0.
(B.16)
Recall from Lemma 9 that
pd,S =
1− γL
1− γL + γLN−1N
(B.17)
does not depend on d, hence within this proof to avoid confusion we denote this by
pS . By substituting the expressions of u
∗([d, L, rS ]) and u∗([d, L, rR]) computed in
Lemma 6 and the expression of v¯ given in (B.2) the LHS of the IC constraint (B.16)
can be rewritten as
pSu
∗([d, L, rS ]) + (1− pS)
(
S0 + δ
(
(1− γH)v¯ + γH
(
c− 1
N − 1µLc+
N − c
N − 1S0
+δ
(
γLv¯ +
(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)
(
d− 1
N − 1µLd+
N − d
N − 1S0 + δγLv¯
)))))
= pS
1
1− δ(1− γL) (S0 + δγLv¯) + (1− pS)
(
S0 + δ
(
(1− γH)v¯ + γH
(
c− 1
N − 1µLc
+
N − c
N − 1S0 +
δ
1− δ(1− γL)
(
γLv¯ + (1− γL)
(
d− 1
N − 1µLd+
N − d
N − 1S0
)))))
=
pSS0
1− δ(1− γL) + (1− pS)
(
S0 + δγH
(
c− 1
N − 1µLc+
N − c
N − 1S0
+
δ(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)
(
d− 1
N − 1µLd+
N − d
N − 1S0
)))
+ v¯
pS δγL1− δ(1− γL) + (1− pS)δ
(
(1− γH) + γH δγL
1− δ(1− γL)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ

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=
pSS0
1− δ(1− γL) + (1− pS)
(
S0 + δγH
(
c− 1
N − 1µLc+
N − c
N − 1S0+
δ(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)
(
d− 1
N − 1µLd+
N − d
N − 1S0
)))
+
τ τ˜
N
[
g(1, µH) + δγHg(c, µL) + δ
2 (1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)γHg(d, µL)
]
,
for
τ˜ :=
1− δ(1− γL)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− γH − γL))
τ :=pS
δγL
1− δ(1− γL) + (1− pS)δ
(
(1− γH) + γH δγL
1− δ(1− γL)
) (B.18)
independent of a, b, c, d. Note that this is separable in c and d. Specifically, by
bringing all the terms depending on c on the LHS and all the terms depending on d
on the RHS, we can rewrite the IC constraint (B.16) as f(c) ≤ g(d) with
f(c) :=
δ(1− pS)γH
N − 1 ((c− 1)µLc+ (N − c)S0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:f1(c)
+
τ τ˜
N
δγH g(c, µL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:f2(c)
+k
g(d) := pSµL(d+ 1)− δ(1− pS)γH δ(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)
(
d− 1
N − 1µLd+
N − d
N − 1S0
)
− τ τ˜
N
δ2
(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)γHg(d, µL)
k :=
pSS0
1− δ(1− γL) + (1− pS)S0 +
τ τ˜
N
g(1, µH)− (1− pS)2µH − δ
1− δS0.
(B.19)
Note that k is a constant independent of c and d. The functions f1(c) and f2(c)
are quadratic, convex and, disregarding the integer constraint, are minimized when
c = µL+S02µL =
S0
2µL
+ 12 and when c =
S0
2µL
, respectively. This means that, disregarding
the integer constraint, f(c) is minimized for some c˜∗ ∈
[
S0
2µL
, S02µL +
1
2
]
. Let c∗ be
the integer minimizer of f(c) (i.e. the integer closest to c˜∗). Recall that xSOL is the
integer minimizer of g(c, µL) (i.e. the integer closest to
S0
2µL
).
There are two possible cases:
(a) if there exists an integer cˆ in the interval
[
S0
2µL
, S02µL +
1
2
]
then c∗ = cˆ = xSOL .
In fact, |cˆ− S02µL | ≤ 12 ⇒ cˆ = xSOL and |cˆ− c˜∗| ≤ 12 ⇒ cˆ = c∗;
(b) if there is no integer in the interval
[
S0
2µL
, S02µL +
1
2
]
then either c∗ = xSOL or
c∗ = xSOL + 1.
In fact, let cˆ− be the largest integer smaller than S02µL and cˆ
+ be the smallest in-
teger larger than S02µL +
1
2 (i.e. cˆ
−+1). Since there is no integer in
[
S0
2µL
, S02µL +
1
2
]
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it must be |cˆ−− S02µL | ≤ 12 ⇒ cˆ− = xSOL . On the other hand c∗ is equal to either
cˆ− or cˆ+ depending on whether c˜∗ is smaller or larger than cˆ
−+cˆ+
2 .
Thus, f(c) is minimized at c∗ = xSOL or c
∗ = xSOL + 1 and for any c˜ 6= {xSOL , xSOL + 1},
we get f(c˜) ≥ f(xSOL ).
We now prove that if (c˜, d˜) satisfies (B.14) with c 6= {xSOL , xSOL +1} then d˜ ≥ xLL. In
fact it must be g(d˜) ≥ f(c˜) ≥ f(xSOL ). Since xLL is the minimum integer satisfying
g(d) ≥ f(xSOL ) it must be d˜ ≥ xLL.
Hence any IC scheme with c˜ 6= {xSOL , xSOL +1} has higher cost then pi∗ (since c˜ ≥ xSOL
and d˜ ≥ xLL) and cannot be optimal.15
3. Any OICS satisfies d¯ ≥ xLL − 1
From the previous point we know, that in any OICS it must be c¯ ∈ {xSOL , xSOL + 1}.
• If c¯ = xSOL then by definition xLL is the minimum value of d¯ to maintain
incentive compatibility.
• If instead c¯ = xSOL +1 we show that to maintain incentive compatibility it must
be d¯ ≥ xLL−1. In fact suppose by contradiction that f(xSOL + 1) ≤ g(xLL−2),
then we show that under our assumptions f(xSOL ) ≤ g(xLL−1), which is absurd
since xLL is the minimum integer satisfying the IC constraint. To this end it
suffices to show
f(xSOL )− f(xSOL + 1) ≤ g(xLL − 1)− g(xLL − 2).
Note that
f(xSOL )− f(xSOL + 1) ≤ g(xLL − 1)− g(xLL − 2)
⇐⇒ δ(1− pS)γH
N − 1
(
S0 − 2xSOL µL +
δ(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)(S0 − 2(xLL − 2)µL)
)
+
τ τ˜
N
δγH
(
S0 − (2xSOL + 1)µL +
δ(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)(S0 − (2(xLL − 2) + 1)µL)
)
≤ pSµL.
(B.20)
15Recall that by (B.2) the cost is τ˜
[
g(1, µH) + δγHg(c, µL) + δ
2 (1−γL)
1−δ(1−γL)γHg(d, µL)
]
and
g(c, µL)/g(d, µL) are minimized for c = x
SO
L /d = x
SO
L and strictly increasing functions for larger values of
c/d.
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Now, by xLL ≥ xSOL + 116 and xSOL ≥ S02µL − 12 (see Lemma 7) the following two
inequalities hold
S0 − (2(xLL − 2) + 1)µL ≤ S0 − 2(xLL − 2)µL ≤ S0 − 2µL(xSOL − 1)
≤ S0 − S0 + µL + 2µL = 3µL
S0 − (2xSOL + 1)µL ≤ S0 − 2µLxSOL ≤ µL
and by δ ≤ 1/2
δ(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL) ≤ 1.
Thus, the left hand side of (B.20) can be upper bounded by
4µL
(
δ(1− pS)γH
N − 1 +
τ τ˜
N
δγH
)
.
So it is sufficient if
4
(
δ(1− pS)γH
N − 1 +
τ τ˜
N
δγH
)
≤ pS
⇐⇒ 4δγH
(
(1− pS) + N − 1
N
ττ˜
)
≤ (N − 1)pS
(B.18)⇐⇒ 4δγH
(
(1− pS) + N − 1
N
τ˜
(
pS
δγL
1− δ(1− γL)+
(1− pS)δ
(
(1− γH) + γH δγL
1− δ(1− γL)
)))
≤ (N − 1)pS
(B.17)⇐⇒ 4δγH
(
γL
N − 1
N
+
N − 1
N
τ˜
(
δγL(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)
+γL
N − 1
N
δ
(
(1− γH) + γH δγL
1− δ(1− γL)
)))
≤ (N − 1)(1− γL)
⇐⇒ 4δγH
γL + τ˜ ( δγL(1− γL)1− δ(1− γL) + γLN − 1N δ
(
(1− γH) + γH δγL
1− δ(1− γL)
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
τˆ

≤ (1− γL)N
⇐⇒ 4δγH (γL + τ˜ τˆ) ≤ (1− γL)N. (B.21)
where the second equivalence comes from plugging in τ and the third from
plugging in pS and multiplying by
(
1− γL + γLN−1N
)
.
16Recall that if xLL = x
SO
L then pi
∗ is equivalent to the social optimum and it is therefore the OICS.
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Now, we show τ˜ ≤ 2. By (B.18)
τ˜ =
1− δ(1− γL)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− γH − γL)) =
1− δ(1− γL)
(1− δ(1− γH))(1− δ(1− γL))− δ2γHγL ≤ 2
⇐⇒ 1− δ(1− γL) ≤ 2((1− δ(1− γH))(1− δ(1− γL))− δ2γHγL)
⇐⇒ 1 ≤ 2
(
(1− δ(1− γH))− δ
2γHγL
1− δ(1− γL)
)
⇐⇒ 1 ≤ 2
(
1− δ + δγH
(
1− δγL
1− δ(1− γL)
))
.
By δγL1−δ(1−γL) ≤ 1 the right hand side can be lower bounded by 2(1− δ). Then
by δ ≤ 1/2 the inequality holds. Now we bound τˆ by 1
δγL(1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL) + γL
N − 1
N
δ
(
(1− γH) + γH δγL
1− δ(1− γL)
)
=
δγL(1− γL) + δγLN−1N ((1− γH)(1− δ(1− γL)) + δγHγL)
1− δ(1− γL)
≤ δ(1− γL) + δγL
1− δ(1− γL) =
δ
1− δ(1− γL) ≤ 1.
Plugging in the bounds for τ˜ and τˆ in (B.21) leads to the sufficient condition
4δγH(γL + 2) ≤ (1− γL)N.
Then by δ ≤ 1/2, γH ≤ 1/2, γL ≤ 1/2 it is sufficient if N ≥ 5, which is true by
assumption.
We are now ready to prove the two main statements:
Proof of statement 2:
Overall, we know that pi∗ is incentive compatible and achieves minimum cost among the IC
schemes with c¯ = xSOL . From the points above, we know that the only other possibility is
c¯ = xSOL +1 in which case d¯ ≥ xLL−1. Any choice of d¯ ≥ xLL leads to higher cost than V ∗
hence the only possibility left is p˜i∗. If p˜i∗ is IC and has cost V˜ ∗ lower than V ∗ then that is
the OICS otherwise pi∗ is. Whether that happens or not depends on the chosen parameters.
Proof of statement 1:
We next show that for δ → 0, V˜ ∗ > V ∗. To this end, recall the expression for v¯ in (B.2)
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and τ˜ in (B.18). Then
V ∗ := τ˜
[
g(1, µH) + δγHg(x
SO
L , µL) + δ
2 (1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)γHg(xLL, µL)
]
,
V˜ ∗ := τ˜
[
g(1, µH) + δγHg(x
SO
L + 1, µL) + δ
2 (1− γL)
1− δ(1− γL)γHg(xLL − 1, µL)
]
,
For δ → 0 the terms in δ2 are negligible and the conclusion follows by g(xSOL , µL) <
g(xSOL + 1, µL).
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